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CONTRACTUAL COMMUNICATION†
Lawrence B. Solum∗
INTRODUCTION
In Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis,1 Professors
Robin Bradley Kar and Margaret Jane Radin develop an important
theory of the nature of contract that draws on Paul Grice’s influential
theory of meaning.2 That theory has significant implications for
contract doctrine, especially for questions about the enforceability of socalled “contracts of adhesion” in particular and for “boilerplate” in general. But at the most fundamental level, Kar and Radin’s work is about
the nature of contractual communication. They answer the question:
How do contracts mean? Their answer proposes a theoretical structure,
which they name “Shared Meaning Analysis.”3 This Response focuses
on “contractual communication”4: it interrogates the philosophical and
linguistic presuppositions of Shared Meaning Analysis and offers, in
embryonic form, a rival view.
Shared Meaning Analysis begins with the idea that “meaning” can
be shared. In the particular context of contractual communication,
meaning is something that can be shared by the parties to a contract,
but the idea of shared meaning is quite general: when a speaker successfully conveys communicated content to a listener, meaning is shared.
Shared meaning arises in mundane contexts, like a conversation about
the weather, and in legal contexts, including communication via
constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations, treaties, judicial opinions,
trusts, wills, and contracts.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
† Responding to Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared
Meaning Analysis, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019).
∗ Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. This Response
is dedicated to Peter Tiersma, my former colleague who passed from this earth long before his time.
On many of the topics discussed in this Response, Peter got there first. See A Tribute to Peter M.
Tiersma, LOYOLA L. SCH., https://petertiersma.lls.edu [https://perma.cc/K3UR-4QQR]. I am grateful to Brian Bix, Enrique Guerra-Pujol, Mitu Gulati, Tal Kastner, Dennis Patterson, Brian Slocum,
and the editors of the Harvard Law Review for many helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions.
1 Robin Bradley Kar & Margaret Jane Radin, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019).
2 Id. at 1144–56. See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS (1989) (collecting many of Grice’s most important papers on the philosophy of language).
3 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1142–43. The capitalization of “Shared Meaning Analysis”
conveys that I am using this phrase as a proper name for Kar and Radin’s theory. I use this same
convention to name other theoretical positions — for example “Public Meaning Originalism” — in
the discussion that follows.
4 The idea of a theory of contractual communication is sometimes raised by legal scholars. See,
e.g., Peter Goodrich, Habermas and the Postal Rule, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1457, 1467 (1996) (raising
the possibility of “a general theory of contractual communication”).
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Take the constitutional context as an example. When a constitutional provision is drafted (for example, by Gouverneur Morris at the
Philadelphia Convention), and the drafter’s communicative intentions
are successfully conveyed to the other Framers, the members of the ratifying conventions, the public at large, and the officials who implement
the constitutional text, meaning is shared.5 The meaning identified by
constitutional theorists as “original public meaning” is a kind of shared
meaning.6 Similarly, if the drafters of a statute successfully convey the
same “plain meaning” (communicative content) to the relevant intended
readerships (including judges, lawyers, and those subject to the statute’s
provisions), then the text of the statute will have a plain meaning.
But just as communication can succeed in the creation of shared
meaning, it can also fail. Communication can misfire for a host of reasons. One such reason is illustrated by the existence of what are called
“terms of art” or “technical language.” Later in this Response, for instance, I will use terms like “implicature,” “impliciture,” and “presupposition.” The first two of these terms are not used in ordinary English,
but they do have precise meanings in the philosophy of language and
theoretical linguistics. The third term, “presupposition,” does have an
ordinary meaning, but it has a more precise meaning when it is used by
professional philosophers and scholars of linguistics. When the author
of a text uses a technical term, but the reader doesn’t know what it
means, then communication fails in a way that the reader can recognize.
But when an author uses a word or phrase in a technical sense and the
reader understands that term in its ordinary sense, communication may
fail without the reader’s knowledge. In either case, we can say that the
communication “misfires.” And “misfire” is itself a technical term used
to describe such failures of communication.
There are numerous other reasons that the communicative content
of a text can fail to produce shared meaning. When installing software
downloaded from the Internet, we are frequently asked to click a link
that says something like “I agree” while given the option to click another
link that takes one to the full text of the software license. If we fail to
click through, read, and comprehend the text of the agreement, clicking
the “I agree” link does not create shared meaning. In the case of such
clickwrap agreements, it seems likely that fully shared meaning is very
rare indeed.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 Here is Kar and Radin’s initial formulation of their notion of shared meaning: “We . . . define
the ‘shared meaning’ of a contract as the meaning parties produce and agree to during contract
formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a contract.” Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1143.
6 Original public meaning is actually shared meaning only if it is successfully communicated.
If constitutional communication misfires, then the meaning intended by the drafter of a constitutional provision can diverge from the meaning grasped by the public.
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Communication can also fail in another way. An officer can order a
subordinate into battle and be disobeyed. I can request extra salsa at a
restaurant, but the wait staff might ignore my request. A contracting
party can make an offer that is rejected. In cases like these, a “speech
act” (more on this concept below7) fails to gain what we can call “uptake.” This is distinct from a failure of understanding: misunderstanding an order is one thing, but disobedience is quite another. The word
“uptake” refers to the success or failure of a speech act: when a speech
act succeeds, it gets “uptake.”
Some communication is cooperative. We might say that shared
meaning is the goal of cooperative communication. Some communication is noncooperative or “strategic.” For example, the drafter of legal
text (such as, a constitutional provision, statute, treaty, or contract)
might want to communicate different messages to different readers.
Thus, a clever drafter might deliberately try to write a statute that conveys one message when it is read by staffers and legislators but can
convey a different message when it is read by judges and lawyers in the
adjudicative process. This kind of strategic communication involves
“speaking out of both sides of your mouth,” deliberately creating meanings that are not shared by all of the intended readers of the text. I will
use the phrase “unshared meaning” to refer to cases in which the content
communicated by a legal text is not shared by those who are intended
to read or to be affected by the text.8
In this Response, I will investigate the foundations of both shared
and unshared meaning in legal communication. Part I takes a step back
from contractual communication and offers a preliminary sketch of a
general model of legal communication; the sketch draws on speech act
theory and the work of Paul Grice, extending and modifying many of
the insights developed by Kar and Radin. Part II turns to contractual
communication, differentiating distinct “situations of contractual communication” and interrogating Kar and Radin’s Shared Meaning
Analysis. Part III interrogates Kar and Radin’s distinction between
“contract” and “pseudo-contract.” The conclusion of the Response
briefly reflects on the significance of Kar and Radin’s project.
I. A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF A GENERAL MODEL
OF LEGAL COMMUNICATION
Before we plunge into Kar and Radin’s account of contractual communication, let us take a step back to consider legal communication
more generally in two steps. The first step lays out some basic ideas
about communication in general. The second step examines some of the
ways in which legal communication involves special considerations.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7
8

See infra section I.A.4, pp. 32–34.
See infra section I.B.3(c), pp. 43–45.
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A. Step One: Communication in General
Before we can understand legal communication, we need some basic
tools for understanding communication in general. Like Kar and Radin,
I will begin with the powerful and influential work of Paul Grice and
then consider the role of semantics and pragmatics before turning to
Grice’s famous maxims.
1. The Neo-Gricean Model of Communication. — The core of Grice’s
account of meaning is the idea of speaker’s meaning. Although Kar and
Radin focus on Grice’s maxims of conversation, the maxims are not the
key to understanding Grice’s view. Instead, Grice’s most fundamental
idea involves what we can call communicative intentions. The
speaker’s meaning of an utterance is the meaning that the speaker intends to convey to the listener via the listener’s recognition of the
speaker’s communicative intentions.
Notice that Grice’s model involves a “reflexive intention.” As
Professors Kent Bach and Robert Harnish put it, “a reflexive intention
is an intention that is intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized.”9 Authors intend for their intentions to be recognized: the
author’s meaning of a text is this intended meaning.
As Kar and Radin observe, Grice distinguishes speaker’s meaning
from sentence meaning.10 The sentence meaning of an utterance or text
is very similar to the idea of “literal meaning” that is more familiar to
lawyers. Sentence meaning is acontextual; it is the meaning of the words
independent of the context of utterance. Sentence meaning is possible
because words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings and
because of the conventions of syntax that we sometimes call “rules of
grammar and punctuation.”
Before we go any further, we should note that the word “meaning”
is ambiguous.11 When we talk about the “meaning” of a legally
operative text, we might be referring to the effect of the text, the purpose
for which the text was written, or the content communicated by the
contextualized linguistic meaning of the text — and there are other
meanings of “meaning.” In the discussion that follows, the word “meaning” and the expression “shared meaning” represent the communicative
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 KENT BACH & ROBERT M. HARNISH, LINGUISTIC COMMUNICATION AND SPEECH
ACTS, at xiv–xv (1979); see also François Recanati, On Defining Communicative Intentions, 1
MIND & LANGUAGE 213, 214–15 (1986) (quoting BACH & HARNISH, supra, at xiv–xv).
10 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1148.
11 On the ambiguity of meaning, see C.K. OGDEN & I.A. RICHARDS, THE MEANING OF
MEANING 186–87 (8th ed. 1946) (exploring different senses of “meaning”); Michael L. Geis, On
Meaning: The Meaning of Meaning in the Law, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1125, 1125–26 (1995) (observing
that the Supreme Court uses the words “mean” and “meaning” in multiple ways); A.P. Martinich,
Four Senses of “Meaning” in the History of Ideas: Quentin Skinner’s Theory of Historical
Interpretation, 3 J. PHIL. HIST. 225, 226 (2009) (“Equivocating on the word ‘meaning’ is easy both
because that word has several related senses and because understanding the meaning of a text in
one of these senses is crucial to understanding its meaning in another sense.”); Lawrence B. Solum,
Intellectual History as Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1115–16 (2015).
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content produced by an utterance or writing in context. This observation brings us to our next topic, the distinction between semantics and
pragmatics.
2. Semantics and Pragmatics. — What are the mechanisms of communication? How do speakers and authors successfully convey their
communicative intentions to listeners and readers? One way to answer
these questions begins with the distinction between “semantics” and
“pragmatics.” For readers unfamiliar with the philosophy of language
and theoretical linguistics, a word of caution: the word “pragmatics” in
the context of the semantics-pragmatics distinction has very little connection to the words “pragmatic” and “pragmatism” as they are used in
legal theory.
The distinction between semantics and pragmatics is contested in the
philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics, but for our purposes,
the following discussion by Bach will suffice to provide a working vocabulary: “[S]emantic information pertains to linguistic expressions . . .
whereas pragmatic information pertains to utterances and facts
surrounding them. Semantic information about sentences is part of sentence grammar, and it includes information about expressions whose
meanings are relevant to use rather than to truth conditions.”12
Bach continues:
Pragmatic information concerns facts relevant to making sense of a
speaker’s utterance of a sentence (or other expression). The hearer thereby
seeks to identify the speaker’s intention in making the utterance. In effect
the hearer seeks to explain the fact that the speaker said what he said, in
the way he said it. Because the intention is communicative, the hearer’s
task of identifying it is driven partly by the assumption that the speaker
intends him to do this. The speaker succeeds in communicating if the hearer
identifies his intention in this way, for communicative intentions are intentions whose “fulfillment consists in their recognition.” Pragmatics is concerned with whatever information is relevant, over and above the linguistic
properties of a sentence, to understanding its utterance.13

Returning to Grice’s distinction between “speaker’s meaning” and
“sentence meaning,” we can now say that the sentence meaning of an
utterance or text is its “semantic meaning,” whereas the speaker’s meaning of an utterance includes the pragmatic dimension of meaning.
Semantic meaning is acontextual; pragmatics takes context into account.
(a) The Mechanisms of Semantics: Conventional Semantic Meanings and Syntax. — How is literal meaning conveyed? What produces
the semantic content of an utterance or writing? A basic answer to these
questions begins with the idea that words and phrases have conventional semantic meanings, produced by patterns of usage. Words and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 Kent Bach, The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction: What It Is and Why It Matters, S.F. ST.
U., http://userwww.sfsu.edu/kbach/spd.htm [https://perma.cc/E8NZ-5VFC].
13 Id. (citation omitted).
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phrases are combined into large units, sentences, by syntax, roughly the
regularities of grammar and punctuation that we sometimes call “rules.”
The line between semantics and pragmatics can be drawn in various
ways. One question concerns the role of contextual disambiguation. A
sentence like “The bank is closed.” might refer to a financial institution
or a public park adjoining a river. For our purposes, it doesn’t matter
whether the semantic content of such a sentence is considered ambiguous or if we use the phrase “semantic content” to refer to the contextually
disambiguated meaning. Whether we put contextual disambiguation on
the semantic or the pragmatic side of the ledger, the full communicative
content includes pragmatics — and it is the full communicative content
that is important for the purposes of interpreting legal texts.
There are many different types of communicative situations involving linguistic exchanges: ordinary conversations about the weather, oral
exchanges involving offers and acceptances, drafting statutes, drafting
contracts, and so forth. When we use language to communicate, we
take advantage of the conventional semantic meanings of words and
phrases and the conventions of grammar and punctuations. In other
words, we can use literal meaning to communicate. But literal meaning
is not the only tool. In ordinary communication, we are not in the situation of someone who puts a message in a bottle, where the only context
available to an unknown future reader is the fact that the words were
found written on a scrap of paper and placed by someone in a bottle
that was tossed in the sea. Ordinary communication almost always involves a context that can enrich the meaning of what we say or write.
This is the domain of pragmatics.
(b) The Mechanisms of Pragmatics. — How do we take advantage
of context to communicate content that is richer than literal meaning?
We have already discussed contextual disambiguation. If I write a contract using the word “bank,” it is quite likely that I dispense with explicit
disambiguation and rely on context to convey which sense of “bank” is
intended. But context can operate in other ways to enrich the communicative content of a text or utterance. The phrase “pragmatic enrichment” is used to refer to this phenomenon, although we might use
“contextual enrichment” to avoid the associations that “pragmatic” has
for lawyers and legal theorists.14
Here are four illustrative forms of contextual enrichment, briefly
described and illustrated by example15:
Implicature: The word “implicature” was coined by Grice to name
the way in which an utterance can convey communicative content that
is different from its semantic content.16 The classic example is a letter
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14
15
16

See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269, 288 (2017).
See id. at 288–91.
See Wayne Davis, Implicature, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Sept. 6, 2019),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature [https://perma.cc/4D6S-M27Y].
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of recommendation. Suppose that I write a letter for a student applying
for a Supreme Court clerkship. The letter reads as follows: “I recommend Alice. They were always on time to class and their attendance
record was perfect.” Literally, the letter communicates a recommendation supported by information about punctuality and attendance. But
in the context, this letter is actually a warning and not a recommendation at all. If the best that can be said about Alice is that they were on
time and did not miss class, the implicature is that Alice is not suitable
for the position of judicial clerk.
Impliciture: Impliciture involves situations in which what is said implicitly includes something else that is closely related.17 For example, if
I say “Jack and Jill are married,” this frequently communicates some
additional information, which could have been stated explicitly as follows: “Jack and Jill are married [to each other].” Article I, Section 9 of
the Constitution explicitly states, “No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto
Law shall be passed,” with [by Congress] as an impliciture.18
Presupposition: Presupposition involves an unstated assumption that
is conveyed by what is said.19 If I say, “Cass is no longer the head of
OIRA,” I also communicate that Cass was once the head of OIRA.
Likewise, if I say, “Adrian is now a Catholic,” I communicate that
Adrian at one time was not a Catholic.20 The constitutional text may
have a variety of presuppositions. Famously, the Ninth Amendment
may presuppose the existence of “other” rights “retained by the People,”
even though it does not say this explicitly.21
Modulation: The intuitive idea is that a conventional semantic
meaning can be adjusted or modulated to fit the context — essentially
a new meaning is created (sometimes on the spot) so that an old word is
used in a new way.22 In the law, modulation can create a new technical
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17
18
19

Kent Bach, Conversational Impliciture, 9 MIND & LANGUAGE 124, 126 (1994).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
See, e.g., Philippe Schlenker, Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition
Projection, 34 THEORETICAL LINGUISTICS 157, 161 (2008); Bas C. van Fraassen, Presupposition,
Implication, and Self-Reference, 65 J. PHIL. 136, 137–39 (1968); David I. Beaver & Bart Geurts,
Presupposition, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Apr. 1, 2011), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
presupposition [https://perma.cc/YX3F-QFXX].
20 Philosophers of language distinguish between “conversational presuppositions” (also called
“speaker presuppositions” or “pragmatic presuppositions”) and “conventional presuppositions” (or
“semantic presuppositions”) that are triggered by particular words or phrases (“no longer” in the
first example above). See Beaver & Geurts, supra note 19. For our purposes, we can put these
technicalities to the side.
21 See U.S. CONST. amend. IX; Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and the Unwritten Constitution, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1935, 1958–61.
22 François Recanati explains modulation as follows:
Sense modulation is essential to speech, because we use a (more or less) fixed stock of
lexemes to talk about an indefinite variety of things, situations and experiences. Through
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meaning for a word that also has an ordinary sense. For example, the
Recess Appointments Clause uses the word “recess,” the literal meaning
of which could refer to any break in the business of the Senate.23 In
context, “recess” may be limited to the break between sessions of the
Senate.24 If so, then the constitutional meaning of “recess” in the clause
is a modulation of the conventional semantic meaning of the word.
Finally, there is a residual category of “free enrichments” that do not
fit into any of these categories.25 For present purposes, the category of
free enrichment and any other forms of pragmatic enrichment are set
aside.
Some legal texts aim to be more explicit than do face-to-face oral
conversations: contracts between sophisticated business entities that
govern complex construction projects may be an example. Some legally
operative utterances are face-to-face oral conversations; the dance of offer and acceptance in a simple contract between a homeowner and a
handyman could illustrate this situation. But whether a legal communication is oral or written, meaning is a product of both semantics and
pragmatics. Literal meaning, contextual disambiguation, and pragmatic
enrichment all play a role in conveying communicative intentions and
hence in the creation of shared meaning.
3. The Role of the Gricean Maxims and Alternatives Thereto. —
Grice’s maxims of conversation play a central role in Kar and Radin’s
account of shared meaning. The maxims are rules of thumb that enable
readers and listeners to grasp the author or speaker’s communicative
intentions. Here is the list of maxims, formulated concisely:
The maxim of quantity, provide as much information as needed but
no more.26
The maxim of quality, be sincere.27
The maxim of relation, be relevant.28
The maxim of manner, be clear and avoid obscurity.29
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
the interaction between the context-independent meanings of our words and the particulars of the situation talked about, contextualized, modulated senses emerge, appropriate
to the situation at hand.
FRANÇOIS RECANATI, LITERAL MEANING 131 (2004) (footnote omitted).
23 See NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828),
http://webstersdictionary1828.com/Dictionary/recess [https://perma.cc/3EZ4-M6N3] (defining “recess” as “[r]emission or suspension of business or procedure; as, the house of representatives had a
recess of half an hour”).
24 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 575 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“A sensible interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause should start by recognizing that the
Clause uses the term ‘Recess’ in contradistinction to the term ‘Session.’”).
25 NICHOLAS ALLOTT, KEY TERMS IN PRAGMATICS 80 (2010).
26 GRICE, supra note 2, at 26.
27 Id. at 27.
28 Id.
29 Id.
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Grice’s maxims are not like the rules of chess. In chess a move contrary to the rules does not count or results in a penalty such as forfeiture,
but in conversation, a certain amount of redundancy, insincerity, irrelevance, and obscurity is par for the course. Grice’s maxims are rules of
thumb — generalizations that help us grasp communicative intentions
most of the time, in most communicative situations, for most speakers.
Perhaps it is unwise to use President Trump as an example, but it
seems likely that the President frequently communicates in ways that
do not conform to the Gricean maxims, adding extraneous comments
that are duplicative, including statements not supported by evidence,
straying from the topic, and speaking in ways that are disorderly, obscure, and ambiguous. Nonetheless, President Trump does communicate. Violating the maxims of conversation might lead to misinterpretation, but ordinarily, an expression that includes redundancy,
insincerity, or irrelevancy will be comprehensible. Obscurity is different;
if an expression is sufficiently obscure or unclear, it may be
incomprehensible.
In many cases, it is obvious that slavish adherence to the maxims
would result in misunderstanding. If the maxims were to be understood
as binding rules, the outcome would frequently be misinterpretation.
The immediately prior two sentences are substantially redundant, violating the maxim of quantity: if one tried to assign them conceptually
distinct meanings, the result would be misinterpretation.
Contracts are frequently drafted in a way that includes deliberate
redundancy — sometimes to avoid misunderstanding,30 but other times
as a result of somewhat mindless combination and copying of prior
contracts dealing with the same type of transaction.31 This is not to say
that the maxim of quantity does not have a legal analogue: the antiredundancy canon is cited in contract cases and elsewhere.32 But in the
law as in human communication generally, redundancy may serve
important functions.33 And redundancy may exist even when it serves
no function at all, but is simply the result of an oversight or error.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
30 See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 631–32,
645 (2016) (“[Generally,] attention to the actual results of legal drafting and the motivations of legal
drafters suggests that drafters of legal documents ranging from statutes to contracts pay no more
than limited heed, if any, to concerns with avoiding redundancy.” Id. at 631–32.).
31 See Lori D. Johnson, Say the Magic Word: A Rhetorical Analysis of Contract Drafting
Choices, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 451, 461–62 (2015) (observing that contract drafters may uncritically repeat language from old contracts because they are unsure of its meaning).
32 See Golden, supra note 30, at 655–56.
33 See Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1105, 1157, 1161 (2003) (“Redundancy in legal communication is valued because of the large
number of potentially interfering messages being sent. To this one can add that a more heterogeneous audience is likely to find redundancy helpful in processing a message.” Id. at 1157 (footnote
omitted).).
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The maxims are formulated for the purpose of describing cooperative communication, but in legal contexts, including contractual
communication, this assumption does not always hold. We need to differentiate between strategic and cooperative legal communication — a
topic that is explored below.34 Moreover, the maxims are controversial
in the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics. For example,
what is called “relevance theory” replaces the maxims with a generalized
principle of efficiency.35
Grice’s maxims point to important features of communications, but
the meaning of an utterance or text is not determined by the maxims.
Communicative intentions can be successfully communicated without
adherence to the maxims, and some communication occurs in contexts
in which the assumption that communication is cooperative does not
hold. Understanding a speaker or author requires that we grasp their
communicative intention and the maxims are means to that end — tools
or rules of thumbs that do not play a constitutive role in communication.
4. Speech Act Theory. — In How to Do Things with Words,36 the
philosopher J.L. Austin developed the notion of a “speech act.”37
Professor Mitchell Green provides the following definition: “[S]peech
acts are those acts that can (though need not) be performed by saying
that one is doing so.”38 There are many things that one can do with
words, including promising, apologizing, ordering, threatening, and
countless others.39 Some speech acts involve the law. By saying
something or writing something, a speaker can do something with legal
effect. Examples of “legal speech acts”40 include placing someone under
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
34
35

See infra section I.B.3(c), pp. 43–45.
See Davis, supra note 16 (“Neo-Gricean theories modify Grice’s principles to some extent, and
Relevance theories replace them with a principle of communicative efficiency.”); see also Deirdre
Wilson & Dan Sperber, Relevance Theory, in HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 607 (Laurence R.
Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 2004).
36 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d
ed. 1975) [hereinafter AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS].
37 See generally id.; J.L. AUSTIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS (J.O. Urmson & G.J. Warnock eds.,
3d ed. 1979); G.J. WARNOCK, J.L. AUSTIN (1989). Many other theorists have contributed to speech
act theory. See generally NEW WORK ON SPEECH ACTS (Daniel Fogal, Daniel W. Harris & Matt
Moss eds., 2018); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF
LANGUAGE (1969); SPEECH ACT THEORY AND PRAGMATICS (John R. Searle, Ferenc Kiefer &
Manfred Bierwisch eds., 1980); John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, 12 LINGUISTICS & PHIL.
535 (1989).
38 Mitchell Green, Speech Acts: Content, Force, and How Saying Can Make It So, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Oct. 2, 2014), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/speech-acts/#ConForHowSayMakItSo [https://perma.cc/4NTF-ECSH].
39 See id.
40 See generally, e.g., MARIANNE CONSTABLE, OUR WORD IS OUR BOND: HOW LEGAL
SPEECH ACTS (2014); DENNIS KURZON, IT IS HEREBY PERFORMED . . . : EXPLORATIONS IN
LEGAL SPEECH ACTS (1986); Paul Amselek, Philosophy of Law and the Theory of Speech Acts, 1
RATIO JURIS 187 (1988).
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arrest, marrying persons to each other, testifying in court, and promulgating an executive order.41 Contracting involves a variety of speech
acts, importantly including offering and accepting — and in the case of
written contracts, affixing a signature to a written agreement.42
Austin developed a technical vocabulary for analyzing speech acts,
distinguishing between “locution,” “illocution,” and “perlocution” as
follows:
Locutionary act: the uttering of a meaningful sentence.43 Example:
Ben says, “I will fix the wall.” The locutionary act is Ben’s utterance of
the sentence.
Illocutionary force: the speech act that is performed via the utterance.44 Example: Ben says, “I will fix the wall” and thereby promises
to fix the wall. The illocutionary force is promising — a type of speech
act.
Perlocutionary effect: the effect produced by the speech act. Example: Ben says, “I will fix the wall,” thereby promising to do so, and this
promise has the effect of inducing Alice to rely on Ben’s promise.45 The
perlocutionary effect is the reliance by Alice induced by the promise.46
In the discussion that follows, I will emphasize the idea that the
content of an utterance can be distinguished from its force. The content
of a locution is its “meaning,” very roughly the disambiguated semantic
content of the utterance.47 The illocutionary force of a speech act is
distinct from its content. The force of an utterance that makes a promise
is promising. The force of an utterance that pronounces two persons to
be married is marrying. The force of an utterance that places someone
under arrest is arresting.48
This next bit is very important. If you are not already familiar with
speech act theory, I urge you to pay close attention. Perhaps you should
read this paragraph twice. The very same utterance (the same string of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41 Daniel W. Harris, Daniel Fogal & Matt Moss, Speech Acts: The Contemporary Theoretical
Landscape, in NEW WORK ON SPEECH ACTS, supra note 37, at 1, 1.
42 Sanford Schane, Contract Formation as a Speech Act, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW 100, 105–08 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012); Peter
Meijes Tiersma, The Language of Offer and Acceptance: Speech Acts and the Question of Intent, 74
CALIF. L. REV. 189, 189, 206 (1986).
43 AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS, supra note 36, at 94.
44 See id. at 98–100.
45 See id. at 101.
46 See id. The following formulation is useful: “In singling out illocutionary acts for theoretical
attention, Austin distinguished them from locutionary acts, which are mere utterances of meaningful expressions, and perlocutionary acts, which are acts of producing effects that are causally
downstream from illocutionary acts.” Harris, Fogal & Moss, supra note 41, at 1.
47 The full content of an utterance in context may include pragmatic enrichments, content that
is added by the context in which the utterance occurs. See Solum, supra note 14, at 273.
48 See Harris, Fogal & Moss, supra note 41, at 22.
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words) can have different illocutionary forces in different contexts.
Thus, “I will fix the wall” can be a prediction or a promise, depending
on the context of utterance49:
Example 1: Alice, “What do you think you will do tomorrow?” Ben,
“I will fix the wall.”
Example 2: Alice, “Do you promise to fix the wall?” Ben, “I will fix
the wall.”
In Example 1, the utterance “I will fix the wall” expresses Ben’s belief that fixing the wall will be his primary activity on the next day: the
force of the utterance is assertion. In Example 2, the utterance “I will
fix the wall” is the making of a promise.50 The semantic content is the
same in Examples 1 and 2, but the illocutionary force is different.
Competent speakers of a natural language understand this distinction
intuitively as a result of pragmatic enrichment.51 We are able to recognize the difference in force between Example 1 and Example 2, although
it might be a bit tricky trying to explain the difference precisely in ordinary English. Speech act theory aims to describe and explain the way
communication works in a theoretical vocabulary that allows us to draw
this distinction in a relatively precise way.52
B. Step Two: Legal Communication
So far, we have been investigating linguistically mediated communication in general. We now turn our attention to legal communication.
We can begin with a typology — a preliminary and incomplete listing
of some of the types of legal speech acts.
1. An Incomplete Typology: Legal Speech Acts. — Legal communications can be divided into types that have distinctive illocutionary
forces. When an officiant pronounces a couple as husband and husband,
wife and wife, or wife and husband, they perform a distinctive speech
act — marrying. When a legislative staffer drafts a statute for
consideration by a committee, they perform a distinctive speech act —
proposing language for committee consideration.53 When parties negotiate a contract, they may perform the distinctive speech acts of offering
and accepting. Here is a tentative and incomplete list of the types of
legal speech acts:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
49 Prediction and promise are not the only possibilities. “I will fix the wall” could also be used
to convey a statement of intention or plan. I am indebted to Professor Brian Bix for this point.
50 If you resist this conclusion, you might imagine a richer context that makes the promise crystal
clear.
51 In Example 2, Ben’s statement includes an impliciture: [Yes, I promise that] I will fix the wall.
The implicit content is recognizable because of Alice’s preceding question.
52 Kar and Radin offer a similar example. See Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1157–58.
53 The word “propose” may have a technical sense, in which only members of the legislature can
officially “propose” a statute for consideration by a committee. In this example, the staffer would
not propose the statute in this technical sense. I am grateful to Bix for this point.
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Contractual speech acts: offering, accepting, rejecting, drafting,
declaring an intention to breach, and rescinding.
Constitutional speech acts: drafting, proposing for consideration by
a constitutional convention, voting for a proposal at a convention and
thereby proposing for ratification, voting against a proposal, and voting
to ratify. Similar speech acts are involved in the amendment process.
Statutory speech acts: drafting, proposing to a committee, voting out
of committee, voting against in committee, voting for on the floor of a
legislative body, voting against on the floor, signing into law, speaking
in favor of a proposal, speaking against a proposal.
Judicial speech acts: voting for or against an outcome in conference,
proposing a draft majority opinion, joining a draft opinion, proposing a
draft dissenting opinion, joining a dissent, and overruling a prior
decision.

2. The Situations of Legal Communication. — There are many types
of legal communication and some of these types involve characteristic
situations of legal communication. The situations provide context that
enables contextual disambiguation and pragmatic enrichments.
Consider the distinct communicative situations involved in constitutional, statutory, and judicial communication.
(a) The Situation of Constitutional Communication. — The nature
of constitutional communication could be disputed, but I believe that
the best account conceives of constitutional communication as involving
a complex multistage process in which public meaning plays a crucial
role. The actual sequence of events is too complex to recount here, but
we can imagine a simplified version of the events that resulted in the
ratified text that was implemented by the First Congress in 179154:
Stage One: Various proposals (such as the Virginia Plan and the New
Jersey Plan) are circulated and discussed at the Philadelphia
Convention.
Stage Two: Various resolutions are introduced, debated, amended,
and adopted by the Convention.
Stage Three: The Committee of Detail refines these resolutions and
proposes a coherent plan for the final drafting of the constitutional text
as a whole, and this plan is debated on the floor of the Convention.
Stage Four: The amended plan adopted on the floor is referred to
the Committee of Style. Gouverneur Morris (perhaps with the help of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
54 There are many accounts of the Constitutional Convention, including RICHARD BEEMAN,
PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009); EDWARD J.
LARSON & MICHAEL P. WINSHIP, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION: A NARRATIVE
HISTORY FROM THE NOTES OF JAMES MADISON (2005); THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (four volumes); JOHN R. VILE, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787: A COMPREHENSIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICA’S FOUNDING (rev. 2d ed. 2016) (two volumes). On ratification, see PAULINE MAIER,
RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2010).
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James Wilson and others) drafts a proposed constitutional text, which is
then voted out of committee, debated, amended, and then adopted by
the Convention as a whole.
Stage Five: The constitutional text is transmitted to the Continental
Congress and made public. The text is then sent to state legislatures
which in turn transmit the text to state ratifying conventions, a sufficient
number of which approve the text. During Stage Five, the constitutional text is debated in public and in the ratifying conventions.
Stage Six: The constitutional text is then put into action by the First
Congress, which passes legislation governing the election of the first
President, enacts legislation creating the structure of the new government, and begins to exercise various powers granted to it by the new
Constitution.
How does this complex multistage process create “shared constitutional meaning”? Again, the full story is beyond the scope of this
Response, but a rough sketch is possible.
Although fragments of the constitutional text actually emerged at
earlier stages, in the simplified model, the constitutional text is drafted
at Stage Five. When Gouverneur Morris drafts the text, he hopes to
convey his communicative intentions to multiple audiences. His immediate audience likely included others who participated in the drafting
process, followed by the other members of the Committee of Style.
Morris aims to convey his communicative intentions to the other members of the Committee, and they aim to recover his communicative intentions. When the delegates on the convention floor receive the draft
from the Committee of Style, they aim to recover the communicative
intentions of the drafters as understood by the members of the
Committee. And when the final constitutional text is passed to the public, the Continental Congress, state legislatures, and eventually to implementing officials, all of these readers aim to recover the communicative
intentions of the drafters — even though it seems likely that they would
not have known who the actual drafters were.
In the case of constitutional communication, the drafters aimed to
produce a text with meaning that would be accessible to the public: this
claim is central to Public Meaning Originalism and can be called the
“Public Meaning Thesis.”55 Justice Story stated the idea:
In the first place, then, every word employed in the constitution is to be
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it. Constitutions are not
designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of expression, for
critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of
philosophical acuteness, or judicial research. They are instruments of a

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
55 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Public Meaning Thesis: An Originalist Account of
Constitutional Interpretation 8 (Apr. 9, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Harvard
Law School Library and most recent version available from the author).
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practical nature, founded on the common business of human life, adapted
to common wants, designed for common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them; the people adopt them; the people must
be supposed to read them, with the help of common sense; and cannot be
presumed to admit in them any recondite meaning, or any extraordinary
gloss.56

If the Public Meaning Thesis is correct,57 then the drafters of the
constitutional text aimed to convey their communicative intentions to
the public. Subsequent readers, including the members of the
Committee of Style, the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, the
public, and implementing officials and judges (including Justice Story)
would have understood that the relevant meaning of the text was its
public meaning. Because the Philadelphia Convention deliberated in
secret, the context of constitutional communication does not include
“legislative history,” but it does include public discussion and debate,
including the Federalist and Antifederalist Papers.
(b) The Situation of Statutory Communication. — Another example
of legal communication is provided by the legislative process. Here is a
simplified model of statutory communication58:
Stage One: A committee staffer drafts a proposed statute and passes
the draft to a legislator, who introduces the draft as a proposed bill.
Stage Two: The draft is referred to committee, where it may be discussed and amended.
Stage Three: The committee votes to send the amended draft bill to
the floor of the legislature, where it may be discussed and amended.
Stage Four: The legislature votes to approve the bill and sends it to
the executive for signature or veto.
Stage Five: The executive signs the bill and it is published as a law.
Of course, actual legislative processes are more complex and may
involve bicameral legislatures, multiple committees, and multiparty negotiations among interested stakeholders who are not formally part of
the legislature. The actual drafter of legislative text might be a legislator, staffer, employee of an industry association or public interest group,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
436–37 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833); see also National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 398
(1920) (“[I]n the exposition of statutes and constitutions, every word ‘is to be expounded in its plain,
obvious, and common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge
it,’ and there cannot be imposed upon the words ‘any recondite meaning or any extraordinary
gloss.’” (McKenna, J., dissenting) (quoting STORY, supra, at 436–37)).
57 The case for the Public Meaning Thesis is made in Solum, supra note 55.
58 For descriptions of the actual process, see WALTER J. OLESZEK, MARK J. OLESZEK,
ELIZABETH RYBICKI & BILL HENIFF JR., CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY
PROCESS (10th ed. 2016); BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW
LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS (5th ed. 2017).
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or someone else.59 When the text of a statute passes from drafter to
member to committee to the floor, those with formal voting power may
or may not read the text.60 A legislator who votes for a statute might
ask a staffer to read and summarize the statutory text or might instead
rely on advice from the leadership of their party.61
The intended readership of a statute might be the public, but this is
not necessarily the case. Some statutes might be primarily aimed at a
regulatory agency and the industry that it regulates. If the drafter of a
statute intends to communicate to a narrow group that employs technical language (terms of art), then the drafter may assume that the readers of the statute will understand the words and phrases in their technical and not ordinary senses. In other words, there are many different
situations of legislative communication. Grasping the communicative
content of a statutory text may require a particular reader to know who
the drafter had in mind as the intended readers of the text: if a judge is
reading a text that was written for a regulatory agency, the judge may
need to acquire knowledge of technical terms to grasp the communicative intentions of the drafter.
(c) The Situation of Judicial Communication. — Judicial communication has its own complex structure. Again, we can lay out a simplified model of communication by an appellate court:
Stage One: After oral argument, the judges confer and make a tentative opinion. The senior judge assigns the opinion to a member of the
panel or court.
Stage Two: The law clerks for the judge draft a sample opinion,
which is then edited by the judge and rewritten by the clerks. This
process may be repeated several times.
Stage Three: The judge approves a draft opinion and circulates it to
the other members of the panel or court. Other judges may offer comments, resulting in modifications to the opinion.
Stage Four: A majority of judges join the opinion, which is then
published.
Of course, the actual processes are more varied. Some judges write
their own opinions. Portions of an opinion may be written by someone
other than the author judge (for instance, another judge or a law clerk
for another judge). Passages may be borrowed from other opinions, the
briefs, or academic writing. Some judges may not read draft opinions
written by their clerks or may delegate the reading of circulated opinions
to their clerks.
Some judicial opinions may be self-consciously written in part for
the public: opinions of the United States Supreme Court in high profile
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
59 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 585–88 (2002).
60 See, e.g., id. at 608.
61 See, e.g., Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 83, 98–99 (2019).
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cases might contain passages that are intended to communicate directly
to the general public. But in most cases, it seems likely that judicial
opinions are written for lawyers and judges. Appellate opinions address
the parties to the particular dispute, the lower court judges to whom the
case is remanded, and future courts that may be bound by the horizontal
or vertical stare decisis effects of the opinion. Most judicial opinions are
written for lawyers and judges using words in their technical legal senses
and with an awareness of the special conventions that govern judicial
opinions. First-year law students become acutely aware of the gap
between ordinary meaning and specialized legal meanings when they
first begin to read judicial opinions — some of which may be quite difficult to comprehend.
(d) The Importance of Multiple Intended Readers in Complex Multistage Legal Communication. — In each of the situations described
above, legal communication includes multiple stages and multiple intended readers. Thus, the drafter of a constitutional provision at the
Philadelphia Convention intended to communicate to the public, but
also to committee members, other members of the Convention, the
Continental Congress, the ratifying conventions, officials who will implement the Constitution, and judges who will resolve disputes arising
under the Constitution. The drafter of a statute may intend to communicate to legislators, staffers, lawyers, judges, and regulators, in the
case of a regulatory statute — or to the public rather than regulators in
the case of a general criminal law that applies to the public at large.
The drafter of a judicial opinion intends to communicate to judges and
lawyers as the primary intended readership, although some opinions
may include passages intended to be read by the public.
Multiple readerships create the possibility that a drafter’s communicative intentions will be understood differently by different categories
of readers. Such divergence may be unintentional. The drafter of a
statute may not have anticipated the regulators and courts would have
different understandings of the same statutory language.62 But it is also
the case that a drafter might deliberately attempt to communicate different content to different readerships. A constitutional clause might be
drafted to be susceptible of an innocuous interpretation during the ratification process but a more radical interpretation by implementing officials and by courts.63
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 This leads to the set of issues addressed by the Chevron doctrine. See Lawrence B. Solum &
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron as Construction, 105 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3300626 [https://perma.cc/59F3-KK6D].
63 This possibility is raised by Professor John Mikhail’s discussion of the Necessary and Proper
Clauses and their relationship to the Preamble. See John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper
Clauses, 102 GEO. L.J. 1045, 1070 (2014) (“Wilson and the other principal framers of the Constitution knew exactly what they wanted to accomplish by adding a complex and ambiguous sweeping
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Similarly, written contracts may have multiple intended readerships.
A contract might be drafted with an intended readership that encompasses both the contracting parties and judges in the event of a dispute
that results in litigation. Divergent meanings might arise inadvertently,
but it is also possible that a drafter might deliberately communicate one
message to a contractual partner and a different message to a judge.
This possibility is discussed below in connection with the distinction
between strategic and cooperative communication.64
3. The Conceptual Structure of Legal Communication. — Three
foundational distinctions are prerequisites to any understanding of legal
communication. The first distinction is that between communicative
content and legal content. The second distinction marks the difference
between “interpretation” (the discovery of the communicative content of
a legal speech act) and “construction” (the determination of the legal
effect given to that content). The third distinction is between “cooperative” and “strategic” communication. Each distinction is considered in
turn.
(a) First Distinction: Communicative Content and Legal Content. —
The first foundation distinction is between communicative content and
legal content.65 One way to approach this distinction begins with the
idea of “content” itself and then proceeds to unpack the difference
between the communicative content of a legal text and the legal content
associated with that text.
When I use the word “content” and the phrase “communicative content” I do not mean to refer to words, phrases, and sentences. I am using
“content” to refer to abstract entities such as concepts and propositions.
Words are used to represent concepts. The word “law” in English represents the same concept as the word “ley” in Spanish. And the concept
of law can be expressed in English using other words, such as “system
of legal norms.” As words are to concepts, so sentences are to
propositions. When I write a sentence in English, I express a proposition
that could be translated into another language or paraphrased using a
different English sentence.
The communicative content of a legal text is conceptually distinct
from the legal content.
For example, the Constitution of the
Confederacy has communicative content, but that legal text does not
produce legal content. No propositions of law follow from the
Confederate constitution. Likewise, a draft written contract can have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
clause to the end of the list of enumerated powers in the Constitution. Indeed, the best reading of
the evidence suggests that they probably saw this ambiguity as a virtue rather than a vice.”).
64 See infra section I.B.3(c), pp. 43–45.
65 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 480 (2013).
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communicative content, but if it is not signed by the parties, it produces
no legal content.
Similarly, the legal content associated with a text can be different
from its communicative content. For example,66 the First Amendment
begins “Congress shall pass no law,”67 but the Supreme Court has
applied the freedom of expression to the judicial branch in cases like
New York Times v. Sullivan.68 The legal content associated with a contract can vary from its communicative content for a variety of reasons.
Contract law includes “default rules” that provide legal content that is
not included in the contract itself.69 Similarly, the “mandatory rules” of
contract law forbid certain kinds of agreements, for example, those that
are contrary to public policy.70
Communicative content and legal content are conceptually distinct:
cases of divergence are important, because they make the distinction
visible. But in many legal contexts, the communicative content of a
legal text is an important determinant of the legal content produced by
the text. Indeed, many of the great disputes in legal theory are about
the proper relationship between communicative content and legal content. Consider the following familiar examples:
Public Meaning Originalism affirms the Constraint Principle: the
original public meaning of the constitutional text should constrain the
legal content of constitutional doctrine.71 Many versions of living constitutionalism reject the Constraint Principle and affirm a power for
constitutional actors, including judges, to adopt constitutional constructions that are inconsistent with communicative content of the text.72
Plain Meaning Textualism affirms that the plain meaning
(communicative content) of a statutory text should constrain the legal
content of statutory constructions. Purposivism affirms that the legal
content of statutory constructions should be determined by the objective
purpose or function of the statutory text, even if the resulting constructions are inconsistent with the communicative content of the text.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
66
67
68

For a further discussion of this example, please see id. at 512.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
376 U.S. 254 (1964) (extending First Amendment protections of the freedom of the press to a
state-created defamation law).
69 For a further discussion of this example, please see Solum, supra note 65, at 493–94.
70 See Lawrence B. Solum, The Boundaries of Legal Discourse and the Debate over Default
Rules in Contract Law, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 311, 312 (1993).
71 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, The Constraint Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 2–3 (Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940215
[https://perma.cc/KMY2-568H].
72 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism Versus Living Constitutionalism: The Conceptual Structure of the Great Debate, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1271–77 (2019).
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The theoretical debates between originalists and living constitutionalists and between textualists and purposivists provide examples of the
importance of the theoretical distinction between communicative content and legal content.
(b) Second Distinction: Interpretation and Construction. — The
second distinction is between interpretation and construction.73 The
distinction has a long history in American legal theory,74 including
important work done by the great contract treatise writer, Arthur
Corbin.75 For the purposes of this Response, I will stipulate the following definitions:
Interpretation is the activity that discerns the meaning (communicative content) of an utterance or text.
Construction is the activity that determines the content of constitutional doctrine and the legal effect of an utterance or text.
In the context of contract law, there are two important contexts in
which interpretation and construction frequently operate:
Contract Formation: When a court addresses contract formation issues, it may need to determine the communicative content of oral or
written exchanges (interpretation); once we know the meaning of the
communications between the parties, we then can ask whether
particular utterances or writings constitute a legally effective offer and
acceptance (construction).
Contract Interpretation and Construction: When a court addresses
the issues that arise when a contract is breached, it may need to determine the communicative content of a written or oral contract
(interpretation). Once the meaning of a contract’s terms has been
ascertained, the court may then need to determine their legal effect
(construction).
Interpretation and construction operate in contract law and in many
other contexts, including constitutional interpretation and construction,
statutory interpretation and construction, and so forth.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
73 See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction,
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010).
74 For the history of the interpretation-construction distinction, see Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, supra note 73, at 487–88. See also Ralf Poscher, The Hermeneutical Character of Legal Construction, in LAW’S HERMENEUTICS: OTHER INVESTIGATIONS 207, 207–08
(Simone Glanert & Fabien Girard eds., 2017); Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 1:
Francis Lieber, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 19, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/19/
interpretation-and-construction-1-francis-lieber-greg-klass [https://perma.cc/5EM4-RPLC]; Greg
Klass, Interpretation and Construction 2: Samuel Williston, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 23, 2015),
https://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/23/interpretation-and-construction-2-samuel-willistongreg-klass [https://perma.cc/HF64-UQJV]; Greg Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur
Linton Corbin, NEW PRIV. L. (Nov. 25, 2015), http://blogs.harvard.edu/nplblog/2015/11/25/
interpretation-and-construction-3-arthur-linton-corbin-greg-klass [https://perma.cc/G7RD-PHVS].
75 See Klass, Interpretation and Construction 3: Arthur Linton Corbin, supra note 74.
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(c) Third Distinction: Strategic and Cooperative Legal Communication. — The third distinction is between two kinds of legal communication, “strategic” and “cooperative.” One way to approach this distinction
is via Jürgen Habermas’s distinction between “communicative action”
and “strategic action.” Habermas defined communicative and strategic
action as follows:
I count as communicative action those linguistically mediated interactions
in which all participants pursue illocutionary aims, and only illocutionary
aims, with their mediating acts of communication. On the other hand, I
regard as linguistically mediated strategic action those interactions in which
at least one of the participants wants with his speech acts to produce perlocutionary effects on his opposite number.76

Through communicative action, the participants “pursue illocutionary aims without reservation in order to arrive at an agreement that will
provide the basis for a consensual coordination of individually pursued
plans of action.”77 The key idea here is the communicative action involves “consensual coordination,” an idea that resonates with the foundational notion of consent in contract law and theory.
Adapting Habermas’s basic distinction between communicative action and strategic action to legal communication, we can distinguish between cooperative legal communication and strategic legal communication. Let us mark the distinction via two definitions:
Cooperative Legal Communication: Legal communication is cooperative if and only if the drafter or speaker aims to make the same communicative content reasonably available to each and every intended
reader or listener without deception.
Strategic Legal Communication: Legal communication is strategic if
and only if the drafter or speaker intends to convey different
communicative contents to different intended readers or listeners or to
convey a message that is deceptive.
These definitions should be viewed as tentative and subject to revision. Complex issues are involved in the precise differentiation of cooperative and strategic legal communication. These definitions provide a
“rough and ready” formulation, but further reflection would undoubtedly prompt further revisions and refinements. These definitions are
general, in that they apply to various types of legal communication but
can be adapted to differentiate between cooperative and strategic
contractual communication, constitutional communication, statutory
communication, and so forth.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
76 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 295 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., 1984); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory
of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 91–93 (1989).
77 HABERMAS, supra note 76, at 295–96.
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The relationship between cooperative versus strategic contractual
communication and Kar and Radin’s notion of shared versus unshared
meaning is complex. Recall that “shared meaning” is communicative
content that is grasped by both parties to the agreement.78 In the case
of an oral contract, the meaning is shared if the communicative content
of the offer made by one party is grasped by the party accepting the
offer. In the case of a written contract with terms drafted by a third
party, shared meaning requires that both parties glean identical communicative content from the text of the agreement.
One way to understand this relationship is via a simple three dimensional two-by-two-by-two matrix. Although the relationship between
“shared versus unshared meaning” and “cooperative versus strategic
communication” exists in many contexts, both legal and nonlegal, the
matrix examines this relationship in the contractual context. The first
dimension (horizontal) is “shared meaning” versus “unshared meaning.”
The second dimension (vertical) is “cooperative contractual communication” versus “strategic contractual communication.” The third dimension (represented by two subcells) is “written” versus “oral” contractual
agreements. The matrix yields eight examples:
Table 1: Sharing and Cooperation in Oral and Written Contracts
Examples in each cell
assume two contracting parties.

Cooperative
Contractual
Communication

Strategic
Contractual
Communication

Shared Meaning
1. Oral Contract:
Oral contract, negotiated in good faith,
terms are mutually
understood.
2. Written Contract:
Written form contract that is actually
understood by both
parties.
3. Oral Contract:
Oral offer and acceptance, offeror accepts knowing that
the legal effect of the
contract will vary

Unshared Meaning
5. Oral Contract:
Oral contract, good
faith offer misfires
and the offeror and
offeree have different
understandings.
6. Written Contract:
Terms were not read
by one party but
were reasonably accessible and anticipatable.
7. Oral Contract: Offeror proposes terms
with different ordinary and legal meanings with intent to
deceive offeree.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
78

See supra section I.A.1, pp. 26–27.
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from the communicative content to the offeror’s advantage.
4. Written Contract:
Written
contract,
read and understood
by both sides, but one
party intends to
breach and evade liability (fraud).

8. Written Contract:
Consumer contract of
adhesion, terms were
not read or understood, drafter included terms that
were not reasonably
anticipatable.

The matrix illustrates the ways in which the distinctions between
“shared and unshared meaning” and “cooperative and strategic communications” can operate in the context of contractual communication.
Strategic communication can involve shared meaning; cooperative communication can involve unshared meaning. But it is also the case that
strategic contractual communication can operate via unshared meaning,
and that cooperative communication can employ shared meaning.
II. APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL THEORY
TO CONTRACTUAL COMMUNICATION
We are now in a position to apply what we have learned about communication in general and legal communication in particular to contractual communication. Our aim will be to investigate Kar and Radin’s
theory of shared contractual meaning and its implications for contract
doctrine and theory.
Some readers may be puzzled by the extended discussion of legal
communication in general in a response that focuses on contractual communication. After all, contract law is conventionally understood as a
distinct and bounded doctrinal field — governed by a set of legal norms
that are semiautonomous. If contract law is semiautonomous, then we
might suppose that contractual communication can be understood
without reference to the implications of the philosophy of language and
theoretical linguistics for legal communication in general. These
thoughts seem reasonable, but the view advanced in this Response is
that they are fundamentally misguided. Contractual communication relies on the same mechanisms as other forms of written and oral communication. Without an appreciation of the semantic and pragmatic mechanisms that enable all linguistic communication, any attempt to theorize
contract law will be impoverished.
Contractual communication relies on the same semantic and
pragmatic mechanisms that enable ordinary face-to-face conversations.
Indeed, some contracts are the products of face-to-face oral exchanges,
and the legal effect of those exchanges is governed by the law of offer
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and acceptance. But many written contracts involve communicative
situations that depart in important ways from a face-to-face conversation. In this regard, contractual communication resembles other forms
of legal communication that involve complex multistage processes. Constitutions and statutes are drafted by one set of actors, proposed and
debated by others, and ratified or enacted by legislatures or referenda.
Written contracts may be drafted by lawyers who borrow language from
contracts or models drafted by other lawyers. Understanding the complex multistage processes of legal communication in general is therefore
an essential step toward an adequate theory of complex multistage contractual communication.
The investigation can begin by laying out a typology of the situations
of contractual communication.
A. The Situation(s) of Contractual
(and Pseudo-Contractual) Communication
Contract law is very flexible. There are many kinds of contracts and
a huge variety of situations in which contractual communication occurs.
To simplify our task, I will limit my examination of the situations of
contractual communication to four prototypes.
1. Negotiated Oral Contracts. — The first prototype is a negotiated
oral contract between individuals. Consider the following exchange between Ben, a homeowner, and Alice, a handyperson:
Ben: Can you fix the faucet?
Alice: Yep. Fifty.
Ben: Fifty dollars? Can you do it today?
Alice: Yep. Won’t take more than a half hour.
Ben: Great. I’ll get out of your way.
Alice: I’m going out to my truck to get some parts. Back in a minute.
Alice completes the work, says, “I’m done,” and Ben pays Alice fifty
dollars in cash, saying, “Thank you. That was fast.”
Notice that in this exchange, the speech acts of offer and acceptance
are less than fully explicit. Ben does not say, “I offer you fifty dollars to
fix the faucet located in this bathroom by 5:00 p.m. today.” Alice does
not say, “I accept your offer.” Nonetheless, Alice communicates an offer
and Ben accepts. The semantic content of their exchange is supplemented by pragmatic enrichment. When Ben explicitly says “great,” the
impliciture is “I agree” or “I accept your offer to do the work for fifty
dollars in 30 minutes.” Both Ben and Alice are able to convey their
communicative intentions based on their shared understanding of the
communicative situation.
2. Form Contracts Adopted by Sophisticated Parties. — The second
prototype is a form contract adopted by sophisticated parties to handle
a routine transaction. One example of such a contract is the Master
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Power Purchase & Sale Agreement (“Master Contract”) drafted by
Edison Electric Institute (EEI) to govern wholesale purchases and sales
of electricity.79 The Master Contract is forty-three pages in length and
includes complex terms expressed using technical terminology.80 The
Master Contract was drafted by a working group, described as follows:
The [EEI] Contract Working Group (CWG) is a broad group of market
participants that includes risk managers and other stakeholders who are
interested in providing input to the [EEI Contract Drafting Committee
(CDC)] and staying abreast of its activities. Both the CDC and CWG
include representation not just from shareholder-owned utilities but all market participants (e.g., coops, banks and marketers, as well as outside
counsels).81

The actual process of drafting the Master Contract in the EEI
Contract Drafting Committee may be opaque to parties who employ the
Master Contract. But they understand that the contract was drafted for
a particular purpose with a particular set of readers in mind.82 The
Master Contract reads as a document that was drafted to be comprehensible to the lawyers and sophisticated players who are employed by
the corporate entities that enter into such agreements and to lawyers
and judges who may become involved if a dispute arises and results in
litigation.83
In actual practice, the Master Contract may or may not result in
shared meaning. For example, if a set of contracting parties have relied
on the Master Contract in a series of transactions over time, it is possible
that the various agents and employees who employ the contract have
changed. At T1, it might have been the case that all of the key players
for all of the parties had actually read the Master Contract and hence
that the communicative intentions of the drafters (the EEI Contract
Drafting Committee) were successfully conveyed to the responsible
agents of the contracting parties. Suppose that at T2, the Master
Contract is modified by the EEI Contract Drafting Committee, perhaps
in response to the recognition of a problem in the original Master
Contract. At T3, however, it might be the case that some of the key
players have been replaced by others who have not actually read all of
the revised Master Contract — indeed, they might be unaware of the
changes from the original version. In this situation, the communicative
intentions of the drafters may not have been conveyed to the responsible
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
79 Master Contract, EDISON ELECTRIC INST., https://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/
mastercontract/Pages/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/8CXD-WDF9].
80 Master Power Purchase & Sale Agreement, EDISON ELECTRIC INST. (Apr. 25, 2000),
https://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/mastercontract/Documents/contract0004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R7BD-GS5A].
81 Working Group and Contract Drafting Committee, EDISON ELECTRIC INST.,
https://www.eei.org/resourcesandmedia/mastercontract/Pages/WorkingGroupandContract
DraftingCommittee.aspx [https://perma.cc/B8LF-U6AN].
82 See Master Contract, supra note 79 (explaining the purpose and goals of the Master Contract).
83 See Master Power Purchase & Sale Agreement, supra note 80, at 6–11.
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agents of one or more of the parties. It is at least possible that the Master
Contract might be adopted without any of the agents of any of the parties having fully grasped the communicative content of the contract.
The meaning of the Master Contract may be accessible to the responsible agents of all the parties without actually bringing “shared meaning”
into existence.
3. Negotiated Complex Agreements Between Business Entities. —
The third prototype is a negotiated complex agreement between business entities. Unlike the second prototype, which involved an “off-theshelf” Master Contract, the third prototype involves clause-by-clause
negotiation involving lawyers and other agents of the business entities.
Of course, clause-by-clause negotiation does not require the parties to
start from scratch. A bespoke contract may involve reuse of contractual
language from prior agreements. Standard clauses and phrases may be
combined in new ways with language that is created for the particular
occasion.
Standard contractual provisions are sometimes called
“boilerplate.”84
Boilerplate contractual language is common because of the advantages it offers to contracting business entities. Ready-to-wear business suits from Men’s Wearhouse are cheaper than bespoke garments
from Savile Row: boilerplate is less expensive than custom-tailored contractual language. Boilerplate that has generated judicial interpretations may come to have a standardized legal meaning and hence lead to
predictable outcomes. As Professors Stephen Choi, Mitu Gulati, and
Robert Scott explain:
Boilerplate terms are ubiquitous in commercial contracting because they
offer the efficiency advantages of standardization. Those advantages include the development of a uniform system of communication that is independent of any particular contractual context.
Thus, parties in
heterogeneous environments who wish to communicate a shared intent can
embody that intent in a fixed and reliable formulation whose meaning does
not vary with the nature of the contract or its context.85

The process of contractual communication involving boilerplate is
complex. A boilerplate clause is initially drafted by a lawyer and included in a contract. The clause becomes accessible to other lawyers,
perhaps because it is discussed and interpreted in a judicial opinion.
The clause is then incorporated by other lawyers in new contracts, which
in turn are copied again. This process may result in communicative
content that is stable over time and shared by relevant agents of the
parties and by judges who interpret the language when disputes arise.
In such cases, the communicative intentions of the original drafter are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84 For discussion of boilerplate, see generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); and Stephen J. Choi, Mitu
Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1
(2017).
85 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 84, at 4–5 (footnote omitted).
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successfully grasped by readers who reuse the text and successfully convey these communicative intentions to yet other readers.
But this is not necessarily the case. When boilerplate is originally
drafted, the situation of contractual communication is bounded: a clause
is written in the context of a particular transaction for the parties and
possibly for the judges who might be called upon to interpret the text in
the case of a dispute. But when the text is reused, the communicative
situation is transformed and hence the communicative content of the
clause may change over time. Such changes are not particularly problematic if the parties to a new contract incorporating old boilerplate
communicate successfully, but there is no guarantee that boilerplate will
result in shared meaning. The meaning of a boilerplate provision
drafted at T1 for Contract One may not carry over to Contract Two at
T2. The words may be the same while the meaning is different — same
text, different communicative content.
Choi, Gulati, and Scott discuss the extreme case, in which a boilerplate clause utterly fails to create shared communicative content:
But standardized terms in boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties are vulnerable to misinterpretation. At the limit, a boilerplate term that
is reused for decades and without reflection merely because it is part of a
standard-form package of terms, can be emptied of any recoverable meaning: this creates a contractual black hole. More commonly, terms that have
lost much meaning still may provoke litigation over essentially meaningless
variations in the boilerplate language. In this latter case of contractual grey
holes, courts may be functionally incapable of devising a plausible meaning
that was attached to the linguistic variations at the time the contract was
drafted. Thus, regardless of whether a boilerplate term has lost all or only
almost all meaning, courts will face an interpretation conundrum that we
collectively term the “black hole” problem.86

The key to understanding the black hole problem is the realization
that a boilerplate clause can be copied mechanically, without the drafter
forming a communicative intention. This problem comes into particularly clear focus in the context of “cut and paste” drafting, where a lawyer might draft a contract by electronically copying text and pasting it
into a new contract without even reading the clause. In such a case, the
drafter of the contract has no first-order communicative intentions of
their own — although the drafter might formulate a second-order communicative intention to adopt some prior understanding (such as the
communicative intention of the original drafter or the shared meaning
that the clause had for the parties to the prior contract).87
One famous example of the reuse of standard contractual language
is the “pari passu” clause included in sovereign debt agreements. “Pari
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
86
87

Id. at 3–4 (footnotes omitted).
On second-order communicative intentions, see infra section II.D, pp. 66–67.
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passu” is Latin and could be translated literally as “with even step.”88
The phrase appears in clauses like this: “The Notes rank, and will rank,
pari passu in right of payment with all other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated External Indebtedness of the Issuer.”89
The conventional understanding of such clauses was that the Notes
(debt instruments) “were intended to stand on the same level footing
without preference or priority among themselves.”90 Choi, Gulati, and
Scott argue that pari passu clauses no longer have clear communicative
content:
[T]he [contemporary meaning of the] pari passu clause, a boilerplate formulation common to sovereign debt contracts for nearly 200 years . . . [is] hopelessly unclear. The recent history of judicial interpretation of this clause
began in Brussels in a case against the Republic of Peru in September 2000,
in which a court issued the first interpretation of the clause in at least a half
century. The same interpretation of pari passu was affirmed by a federal
court in New York in a case against the Republic of Argentina in December
2011, and affirmed again on appeal in that same case in October 2012 and
August 2013. In each of these cases, the courts endorsed an interpretation
of a particular variation of pari passu that required holdout creditors to be
paid in full as a condition to the sovereigns paying consenting creditors under a restructuring agreement. Even though this interpretation effectively
undermined efforts by sovereigns to restructure their bonds, and even
though the courts’ interpretation was widely vilified in the market, meaningful revisions to the language of the boilerplate term did not even begin
to appear until late 2014.91

If the story told by Choi, Gulati, and Scott is correct, pari passu
clauses failed to create shared meaning. The drafters of sovereign debt
agreements may not have given much thought to the meaning of the
clause or they may have mistakenly assumed the clause would receive a
judicial construction in line with the expectations of the parties to sovereign debt agreements.
The pari passu clause example illustrates the importance of attending
to the actual situation of contractual communication. On the surface, a
complex negotiated contract between business entities seems to resemble
a face-to-face negotiated oral contract, but the surface appearance is
misleading. In the first prototype (Ben and Alice negotiating a faucet
repair),92 communicative intentions are successfully conveyed, resulting
in the acceptance of an offer and the creation of a contract. But in the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
88 Google
Translate,
GOOGLE,
https://translate.google.com/#view=home&op=
translate&sl=la&tl=en&text=pari%20passu [https://perma.cc/5LP3-CK8J].
89 Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments,
53 EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2004).
90 FRANCIS BEAUFORT PALMER, COMPANY PRECEDENTS 110 (8th ed. 1902).
91 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 84, at 6 (footnotes omitted).
92 See supra section II.A.1, p. 46.
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case of boilerplate clauses that create “black hole problems,” the drafter
does not have the requisite first-order communicative intentions: the negotiations fail to produce shared communicative content.
4. Contracts of Adhesion. — The fourth prototype is a contract of
adhesion between a business entity and a consumer. One example of
such an agreement is the “Google Terms of Service,”93 to which users
may agree when they first use various Google services, such as Gmail,94
Google Calendar,95 or Google Drive.96 A contract of adhesion is a standard form contract that is offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis: by definition a contract of adhesion is not negotiated.97 The Google Terms of
Service agreement is a contract of adhesion, because the terms are standard and nonnegotiable. I haven’t actually tried to negotiate with Google
over the terms of service, but I am willing to bet that any such attempt
would be unsuccessful: Google offers Gmail on a “take-it-or-leave-it”
basis.
The Google Terms of Service are relatively short, although they contain cross references to other terms, such as Google’s “Privacy Policy.”98
My impression is that the Google Terms of Service are mostly written
in clear and concise language that can be understood by competent
speakers of standard American English, but some provisions do incorporate legal terms of art. Here are some examples:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
93 Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (Oct. 25, 2017), https://policies.google.com/terms?hl=
en-US [https://perma.cc/WSL9-RXHZ].
94 Get
More Done with Gmail, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/gmail/about
[https://perma.cc/7KDC-5ULK].
95 Google Calendar, GOOGLE, https://calendar.google.com/calendar [https://perma.cc/Y534M6LC].
96 Google Drive, GOOGLE, https://google.com/drive [https://perma.cc/H9T7-S6W3].
97 Professor Todd Rakoff offers the following definition:
(1) The document whose legal validity is at issue is a printed form that contains many
terms and clearly purports to be a contract.
(2) The form has been drafted by, or on behalf of, one party to the transaction.
(3) The drafting party participates in numerous transactions of the type represented
by the form and enters into these transactions as a matter of routine.
(4) The form is presented to the adhering party with the representation that, except
perhaps for a few identified items (such as the price term), the drafting party will enter
into the transaction only on the terms contained in the document. This representation
may be explicit or may be implicit in the situation, but it is understood by the adherent.
(5) After the parties have dickered over whatever terms are open to bargaining, the
document is signed by the adherent.
(6) The adhering party enters into few transactions of the type represented by the
form — few, at least, in comparison with the drafting party.
(7) The principal obligation of the adhering party in the transaction considered as a
whole is the payment of money.
Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1177
(1983) (footnote omitted).
98 Google Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Oct. 15, 2019), https://policies.google.com/privacy?hl=
en-US [https://perma.cc/U7HD-YJ4W].
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Some of our Services allow you to upload, submit, store, send or receive
content. You retain ownership of any intellectual property rights that you
hold in that content. In short, what belongs to you stays yours.
SOME
JURISDICTIONS
PROVIDE
FOR
CERTAIN
WARRANTIES,
LIKE
THE
IMPLIED
WARRANTY
OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY
LAW, WE EXCLUDE ALL WARRANTIES.
The laws of California, U.S.A., excluding California’s conflict of laws
rules, will apply to any disputes arising out of or relating to these terms or
the Services. All claims arising out of or relating to these terms or the
Services will be litigated exclusively in the federal or state courts of Santa
Clara County, California, USA, and you and Google consent to personal
jurisdiction in those courts.99

I don’t know who drafted the text of the Google Terms of Service,
but it seems plausible (and perhaps likely) that they were drafted by
Google’s in-house lawyers. Perhaps an initial draft was written and
edited, with subsequent versions edited by the original drafters or by
new lawyers who were not part of the original drafting process. It seems
quite likely that any particular posted version of the Google Terms of
Service was actually read and understood by some lawyer who approved the final version. Once again, we have a multistage process of
communication, in which the communicative intentions of the drafters
of various clauses are conveyed to others who participate in the drafting
process. The drafters likely understand that the terms they write will
sometimes be read by Google users and may also be read by lawyers
and judges if disputes arise.
B. The Idea of Shared Meaning
The discussion that follows interrogates Kar and Radin’s notion of
“shared meaning.” What is required for “meaning” to be “shared”? How
does shared meaning relate to the Gricean notion of speaker’s meaning
and Austin’s idea of a speech act? The discussion that follows suggests
two distinct conceptions of “shared meaning” before turning to an indepth investigation of Kar and Radin’s version.
1. “Shared Meaning” as Successfully Communicated Content and
Force. — Contractual communication can be explicated via Kar and
Radin’s idea of “shared meaning,” the Gricean notion of communicative
intentions, and Austin’s idea of illocutionary force. For example, in negotiated oral contracts, the parties create shared meaning if they are able
to successfully convey their communicative intentions. Notice that
success requires mutual recognition of both the content and force of the
offer and the acceptance. Mutual recognition of content requires that
the offeror’s communicative intention to offer particular terms (content)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
99

Google Terms of Service, supra note 93.
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be successfully conveyed to the offeree — and that these terms be recognized by the offeree as the speech act of offering (force).
These abstract ideas are illustrated by Raffles v. Wichelhaus,100 commonly known as the ship “Peerless” case. Judge Mellish explained:
There is nothing on the face of the contract to shew that any particular ship
called the “Peerless” was meant; but the moment it appears that two ships
called the “Peerless” were about to sail from Bombay there is a latent ambiguity, and parol evidence may be given for the purpose of shewing that
the defendant meant one “Peerless” and the plaintiff another. That being
so, there was no consenus [sic] ad item, and therefore no binding contract.101

The report is brief and does not include a narrative of offer and acceptance, but the following account seems plausible. There is no dispute
about the illocutionary force of the offer and acceptance. Both parties
agreed that there was an attempt to enter into agreement; the communicative intentions to engage in the speech acts of offering and accepting
were successfully conveyed. Nonetheless, the communication misfired
because the content of the offer contained a proper name (“Peerless”)
that had two possible referents, the two ships that had the name
“Peerless.”102 The offeror failed to successfully convey the content of
their offer to the offeree.
Contractual communication can misfire for a different reason: the
communicative intention to convey a particular illocutionary force can
misfire. A communication not intended to have the force of an offer
might nonetheless be understood as such.103 A communication not intended to have the force of an acceptance might be misconstrued as an
acceptance. Successful contractual communication requires mutual
recognition of both content and force.
Contractual communication can fail, but it can also succeed. When
the communicative intentions of an offeror with respect to both force
and content are successfully communicated to an offeree who then
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
100 (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906. See generally A. W. Brian Simpson, Contracts
for Cotton to Arrive: The Case of the Two Ships Peerless, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 287 (1989).
101 Raffles, 159 Eng. Rep. at 376.
102 Raffles involved a proper name, but the same problem can arise with respect to terms that
represent some general concept or kind of thing. Thus, in Indiana Fuel Supply Co. v. Indianapolis
Basket Co., 84 N.E. 776 (Ind. App. 1908), the offeror and offeree had different understandings of
the phrase “egg coal”:
If in this case the terms of the contract entered into by the parties would properly describe
domestic egg coal, and could be understood by either of the parties as meaning domestic
egg coal, and would also describe steam egg coal, and could be understood by either of
the parties as meaning steam egg coal, and one of them had in mind when he contracted
for egg coal the higher grade of coal, and the other had in mind when entering into the
contract the lower grade of coal, and each party believed that by the terms of the contract
he was contracting for the particular kind of coal he had in mind, then no contract was
entered into between the parties.
Id. at 777; see also William F. Young, Jr., Equivocation in the Making of Agreements, 64 COLUM.
L. REV. 619, 625 (1964) (discussing Indiana Fuel, Raffles, and similar cases).
103 See Tiersma, supra note 42, at 225; see also Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 353, 361 (2007).
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successfully conveys both the force and content of an acceptance, the
result could be called “shared meaning.” In negotiated oral contracts,
communicative intentions may be conveyed semantically by explicit
statements, but this is not required, because an offer or acceptance may
be conveyed implicitly as a result of pragmatic enrichment. The first
interpretation of the idea of shared meaning is successfully communicated content and force that results in an actual agreement between the
parties.
Notice, however, that outside of negotiated oral contracts, the parties
may view themselves as having entered into a contract despite the fact
that the full content of the agreement is not actually shared. Consider
the following scenarios:
Scenario One: The parties to a complex transaction use a standard
form agreement (such as the EEI Master Contract) without realizing
that one of the salient terms in the form has changed since the last time
at which agents of the parties thoroughly vetted the form. When the
parties enter into the agreement they have a shared understanding of
the illocutionary force of their communications (for example, offer and
acceptance), but neither party’s agents actually comprehend the full content of the form.
Scenario Two: The parties to a complex transaction negotiate a bespoke agreement without realizing a particular boilerplate clause has a
standard meaning with legal consequences to which they would not
have agreed (such as the pari passu clause that was contained in many
sovereign debt agreements). Again, there is a shared understanding of
illocutionary force, but neither party’s agents actually comprehend the
content of the clause.
Scenario Three: The consumer who agrees to a contract of adhesion
(such as the Google Terms of Service) does not read the agreement but
understands that they are agreeing to something that they have chosen
not to read. Again, there can be mutual understanding of force, but the
content of the agreement is only understood by the agents of the business
entity.
In each of these examples, there is no “shared meaning” if we understand shared meaning to require the successful communication of both
force and content. In Scenarios One and Two, the conventional understanding would be that the parties have entered into a contract despite
the absence of “shared meaning” in the sense of successfully communicated force and content. Scenario Three is open to dispute: perhaps
there is a contract, perhaps not.
If “shared meaning” requires successful communication of both force
and content and if “shared meaning” is required for “contract,” then the
agreements in Scenarios One, Two, and Three are not “contracts” and
should instead be denominated “pseudo-contracts” (Kar and Radin’s terminology). On the other hand, perhaps one or more of these scenarios
should be understood as involving proper “contracts.” If so, that would
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raise a question about either the nature of “shared meaning” or the
requirement that an agreement involve “shared meaning” in order to be
properly denominated a “contract.” What happens if we propose a less
stringent understanding of “shared meaning”?
2. “Shared Meaning” as Reasonably Accessible Content and
Successfully Communicated Force. — Consider a second possibility. We
might understand “shared meaning” as extending to cases in which illocutionary force is successfully communicated and content is either successfully communicated or is reasonably accessible to both parties. The
second understanding of “shared meaning” relies on the notion of “reasonably accessible content.” The basic idea here is that content can be
accessible but not yet accessed. That idea should be uncontroversial.
In written communication, it is almost always the case that content is
created before it is actually conveyed.104 A draft contract has content
before the draft is read by someone other than the drafter.
Scenario One105 involves content that is reasonably accessible to both
parties but is not actually communicated. In Scenario One, the EEI
Master Contract could be understood by the agents of the parties. Because the lawyers for the parties could read and comprehend the content
of the agreement with the usual amount of effort required, the content
of the Master Contract is “reasonably accessible” as I am using that
phrase. So, if “shared meaning” is understood in this way and if “shared
meaning” is required for “contract” (as opposed to pseudo-contract), then
the Master Contract is a true “contract.”
Scenario Two106 may be different. If pari passu clauses have a “black
hole problem,”107 then the content of a contract containing such clauses
may not be reasonably accessible to either party. There may be other
provisions of the contract with successfully communicated content or
with reasonably accessible content, but the full communicative content
of the agreement contains a gap. We might be tempted to say that such
an agreement is not a true “contract,” but there are other possibilities.
We might say that the pari passu clause has no legal effect, creating a
gap that must be filled, either by an off-the-shelf default rule or a
bespoke provision created by judicial construction.
3. Kar and Radin’s Understanding of “Shared Meaning.” — I now
turn to Kar and Radin’s explication of the idea of “shared meaning.”
Here is their initial definition of “shared meaning”:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
104 There are possible situations in which content is conveyed as it is being created. For example,
if someone were to be looking over my shoulder as I wrote this Response, content creation and
conveyance would be simultaneous — as is ordinarily the case in face-to-face oral communication.
105 See supra section II.B.1, p. 54.
106 See supra section II.B.1, p. 54.
107 Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 84, at 3–4.
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We . . . define the “shared meaning” of a contract as the meaning parties
produce and agree to during contract formation that is most consistent with
the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a
contract.108

This definition cannot be what Kar and Radin would endorse upon
reflection. The definition contains two elements:
Element One: “[T]he meaning parties produce and agree to during
contract formation.”
Element Two: “[T]he meaning . . . that is most consistent with the
presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a
contract.”
When both elements are satisfied, this definition is very close to the
first formulation above — “successfully communicated content and
force.” Their definition implicitly assumes that the intended force of the
communications (for example, offer and acceptance) was to create a contract. When content is successfully communicated and the parties are
engaging in cooperative contractual communication, then both
Elements One and Two are satisfied.
But Elements One and Two can come apart in a variety of ways.
Element Two assumes cooperative contractual communication, but contracting parties can engage in strategic communication that nonetheless
produces shared understandings of communicative content — as illustrated in Table 1.109 In such cases, the content that would have been
produced by cooperative communication may diverge from the content
that was actually shared.110
Another source of possible divergence is illustrated by Scenario One,
in which the parties agree to the EEI Master Contract but do not actually comprehend its terms. Are the unnoticed terms part of “the meaning parties produce and agree to during contract formation”?111 Here,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1143.
See supra Table 1.
Elements One and Two might be intended to express necessary and sufficient conditions for
shared meaning. That is, for meaning to be shared it must both be produced and agreed to during
contract formation, and it must also be maximally consistent with the presupposition that both
parties were using language cooperatively to form a contract. If this understanding is correct, then
failure to satisfy either element results in a lack of shared meaning. For example, a contract that
violated the maxim of quantity by containing redundant provisions would lack “shared meaning”
even if both parties understood the redundant provisions. Similarly, a contract that satisfied all the
maxims would lack shared meaning if one or more of the parties failed to grasp its content. In any
event, this interpretation of the second definition is inconsistent with its actual wording: “We then
define the ‘shared meaning’ of a contract as the meaning parties produce and agree to during contract formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a contract.” Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1143 (emphasis added). The italicized
portion of the definition is not a conjunction: shared meaning is agreed meaning “that is most consistent” with the specified presupposition. Id.
111 Id. (emphasis added).
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my reaction is that Kar and Radin’s notion of “produce and agree”112 is
ambiguous, with at least two possible interpretations.
Consider the first interpretation of “produce and agree.” Production
and agreement might simply mean that the parties somehow produced
a text and then agreed to be bound by the standard meaning (Gricean
sentence meaning) of that text. This first interpretation of their definition would entail that the terms of the EEI Master Contract are “shared
meaning” — assuming that the terms of the Master Contract are consistent with cooperative contractual communication.113
Or they might require that the parties produce and agree to the actual meaning (communicative content) of the contract. On this second
interpretation of “produce and agree,” the EEI Master Contract would
not satisfy Element One, but it might still satisfy Element Two —
revealing the potential inconsistency between Element One and Element
Two. Kar and Radin use expressions like “a shared meaning to which
both parties actually agreed.”114 Their use of this expression seems to
support the second interpretation. And Kar and Radin seem to
explicitly reject the first interpretation when they state, “delivery of text
is not the same thing as successful production of shared meaning for a
contract.”115
The second interpretation of “produce and agree” also seems to be
supported by their analysis of boilerplate terms: “‘terms’ — which now
include enormous streams of boilerplate text that are delivered but never
read by anyone — are no longer terms with shared meaning.”116 And
the second interpretation is also supported by the footnote to their definition, which reads as follows:
The common meaning of the parties cannot be discerned if the only factor
considered is what a sentence would mean to a competent language speaker,
regardless of whether it was ever cooperatively communicated. This approach is sometimes dubbed “objective.” A contract also cannot be properly
interpreted based on a deviant interpretation held secretly by one party.
This approach is sometimes labeled “subjective.”117

The emphasis in this passage is on what is “communicated,” suggesting that actual communication of content is required by the phrase “the
meaning parties produce and agree to during contract formation.”118
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
112
113

Id.
The first interpretation relies on the distinction between first- and second-order communicative intentions that is discussed below. See infra section II.D, pp. 66–67. On the first interpretation,
it is sufficient for the parties to have a meshing second-order communicative intention — specifically, the intention to be bound by the standard or ordinary meaning of the words.
114 Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1139 (emphasis added).
115 Id. at 1155.
116 Id. at 1140.
117 Id. at 1143 n.18.
118 Id. at 1143.
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How could Kar and Radin resolve the tension between Element One
and Element Two of their proposed definition? One possibility is that
“shared meaning” is actually defined by Element Two. That possibility
is suggested by a second definition of “shared meaning” offered at a later
point in their article: “The shared meaning of a contract is the meaning
that is most consistent with the presupposition that both parties were
using language cooperatively to form a contract.”119 The second definition omits Element One.
At this point, it is important to observe that there is a deep difference
between the second interpretation of Element One (requiring communicative content that is actually shared) and Element Two as reflected in
Kar and Radin’s second definition. Element One limits the terms of a
contract to those that actually were shared. Element Two and the second definition involve meaning that is potentially counterfactual. The
meaning that is most consistent with using language cooperatively may
or may not be the same as the meaning that was actually shared.
The key to understanding the second definition is the phrase “most
consistent with cooperative contractual communication.” What does
this mean? The answer comes in Kar and Radin’s third definition of
“shared meaning”:
The “shared meaning” of a contract can now be defined at a suitable
level of generality as that meaning that is most consistent with the presupposition that both parties were using language cooperatively to contract —
that is, in accordance with the four relevant Maxims of Quantity, Quality,
Relation, and Manner, and any further specifications of them. The shared
meaning of a contract differs from both sentence meaning and any one
party’s speaker meaning.120

The third definition cashes out the idea of shared meaning in terms of
consistency with Grice’s maxims of conversation.
In some cases, the meaning that is most consistent with the maxims
will be the communicative content that is actually shared by the parties,
but in other cases the content that would be most consistent with the
maxims of conversation will be different from the content that was
actually shared.
Let us give a name to Kar and Radin’s third definition, which glosses
“shared meaning” as the meaning that is most consistent with the
maxims:
Maxim Maximizing Meaning is the communicative content that
would have been produced if the parties to an agreement had
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
119
120

Id. at 1146.
Id. at 1154. The third definition is clearly distinct from the second. Whereas the second
definition contains two elements, the third definition (as stated) contains only one. It is possible
that the third definition is phrased badly and that Kar and Radin actually intended the third definition as a gloss on the second element of the second definition. This possibility leaves the tension
between the two elements of the second definition without explicit resolution. See supra note 110.
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communicative intentions and understandings that were maximally consistent with the maxims of conversation.
And let us define the contrasting notions of actually shared meaning
and actual meanings that are not shared.
Shared Actual Meaning is the communicative content that results if
communicative intentions are successfully conveyed in contractual communication. For example, if both the content and force of an offer are
successfully communicated by an offeror and an offeree successfully
communicates the content and force of an acceptance, then the communicative content of the resulting agreement is Shared Actual Meaning.
Unshared Actual Meanings are the communicative contents that result if the communicative intentions are misunderstood in contractual
communications. For example, if the content of an offer is not successfully communicated by an offeror resulting in an offeree grasping content that is different, then the resulting “contract” has Unshared Actual
Meaning — as in Raffles v. Wichelhaus.121
Finally, let us add a definition for meanings that are reasonably accessible to the parties to an agreement, but are not actually shared:
Reasonably Accessible Meaning is the communicative content that
would result if the communicative intentions of the drafters of contractual language had been successfully conveyed to the contracting parties
(whether or not the drafter is a party) if and only if these communicative
intentions were reasonably accessible to the parties in due course.
With these four stipulated definitions in place, we are now in a position to undertake a more precise analysis of the conceptual structure
of Kar and Radin’s shared meaning theory.
Maxim Maximizing Meaning can be identical to Shared Actual
Meaning — as in the case of a negotiated oral contract in which the
behavior of the parties conforms to the maxims of conversation: a successfully negotiated oral agreement like the one between Ben and Alice
discussed above is an example of such identity.122 But this need not be
the case. In some cases, the Maxim Maximizing Meaning will be identical to the Reasonably Accessible Meaning — as may be the case in the
hypothetical in which parties agree to the EEI Master Contract but are
unaware of some new terms (and hence lack Shared Actual Meaning).123
In other cases, the Maxim Maximizing Meaning will be one of the
Unshared Actual Meanings that arise when contractual communication
misfires: if the offeror’s communicative intentions are more consistent
with the maxims than the offeree’s understandings of those intentions,
then the offeree’s intentions are the Maxim Maximizing Meaning — and
vice versa if the offeree’s understandings are more consistent with the
maxims.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
121
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(1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375; 2 Hurl. & C. 906.
See supra section II.A.1, p. 47.
See supra section II.A.2, p. 47.
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My investigation of Kar and Radin’s idea of “shared meaning”
suggests that this notion is not a simple one. Shared Actual Meaning,
Reasonably Accessible Meaning, and Maxim Maximizing Meaning are
conceptually distinct and sometimes diverge in application. The next
step in my investigation is to examine Kar and Radin’s application of
the Shared Meaning Analysis to problems of contract law.
C. Shared Meaning and Contract Construction
How does Shared Meaning Analysis play out in contract law? This
question marks an important conceptual move from the discussion of
the nature of “shared meaning.” When we ask questions about the legal
effect that courts will give to contractual communications, we turn from
interpretation (the discovery of communicative content) to construction
(the determination of legal effect). Kar and Radin believe that Shared
Meaning Analysis enables us to differentiate between contract and
pseudo-contract.124 When courts ask the question, “What are the terms
of a contract?,” they should limit their answer to those terms which are
part of the shared meaning of the contract. How would this work in
practice? And how does Shared Meaning Analysis handle divergence
between Shared Actual Meaning, Reasonably Accessible Meaning, and
Maxim Maximizing Meaning? Kar and Radin investigate these questions in a variety of contexts, but I will limit my discussion to two specific contexts: boilerplate and fine print.
1. Shared Meaning and Boilerplate. — How should the law treat
boilerplate? Kar and Radin’s analysis of boilerplate begins with a test
that requires judges to perform a thought experiment:
We suggest that courts imagine that all of the written and digital text
exchanged during contract formation is converted into oral form and takes
place in a face-to-face conversation between the relevant parties. With respect to any disputed boilerplate text, courts can then ask the following
question:
Could this boilerplate text have plausibly contributed to an oral conversation that contributes terms to a contract consistent with the presupposition that both parties were observing the cooperative norms that govern
language use to form a contract?125

The thought experiment involves a counterfactual — an oral conversation in which the string of words constituting the boilerplate is read
out loud. The thought experiment asks whether the boilerplate would
have created shared communicative content in an oral exchange.
Kar and Radin contend that this thought experiment can be used to
identify “shared meaning,” but when they describe the work they believe
the test will perform, they shift from the language of counterfactuals to
the language of actual agreement. Here is the key passage:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
124
125

See Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1142–43.
Id. at 1167.
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The first question that the conceptual test of [S]hared [M]eaning
[A]nalysis can help courts answer more accurately is whether any disputed
piece of boilerplate text contributes to an actual agreement between parties.
Actual agreement is a boundary line. Without any actual agreement, there
is no contract; whereas any boilerplate text that falls within the scope of
parties’ actual agreements adds terms to a contract that are presumptively
legally enforceable. Actual agreements also have content, which is identical
to the common meaning of the parties. This has implications for the scope
of parties’ actual agreements and contracts.126

Given our investigation of the nature of “shared meaning,” there is
reason to be concerned about the apparent tension between the counterfactual nature of the thought experiment and the work that it is
supposed to do — determining “actual agreement” and “the common
meaning of the parties.”
We can examine this tension by considering one of their examples
and contrasting it with the second prototypical situation of contractual
communication introduced above, the EEI Master Contract.127 Kar and
Radin discuss similar agreements in the following passage, with an important sentence highlighted (by me) in italics:
How does [S]hared [M]eaning [A]nalysis relate to boilerplate text
required of members in particular businesses or trade associations? Many
of the issues posed by boilerplate that is generated by trade associations are
not issues of contract scope or interpretation. For example, the requirement
of some industry-wide boilerplate terms could be anticompetitive under certain (perhaps many) circumstances — creating ensconced collusion and
making new entry into the market difficult or economically impossible (too
risky, or otherwise too expensive). Still, the participants in associations like
these are typically sophisticated parties who understand and even play a
role in producing changes from time to time to the required boilerplate text.
Though the linguistic interactions are more complex, it is possible to understand most or all of this boilerplate text as contributing to a longer-term oral
conversation in which the text is actually conveyed and understood at some
point by most or all of the relevant sophisticated parties. So unlike in the
case of consumer clickwrap purchases, there should be fewer problems with
this type of high-end boilerplate creating actual agreements with shared
meanings. Most disputes should be over how to interpret the shared
meaning of this boilerplate text in social context, rather than over whether
the boilerplate text contributes terms to the contracts.128

The italicized passage is illuminated by recalling the distinctions between Shared Actual Meaning, Unshared Actual Meaning, Maxim
Maximizing Meaning, and Reasonably Accessible Meaning as defined
above.129 Kar and Radin’s counterfactual thought experiment is a vehicle for recovering Maxim Maximizing Meaning, but because it is a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 1173.
See supra section II.A.2, pp. 47–48.
Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1189 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
See supra section II.B.3, pp. 58–59.
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counterfactual it does not aim to recover Shared Actual Meaning, despite the misleading reference to “the text” being “actually conveyed and
understood at some point by most or all of the relevant sophisticated
parties.”
Consider the implications of Kar and Radin’s thought experiment
for the hypothetical introduced in the discussion of the second prototypical situation of contractual communication.130 The EEI Master
Contract would produce Shared Actual Meaning if it were read and
understood by agents of the parties, but in the hypothetical, the agents
of the contracting parties have not read and understood the most recent
version of the agreement because they assume that it is the same as a
prior version employed by the parties. Some of the terms in the EEI
Master Contract are not “actually conveyed and understood” by either
of the parties in the hypothetical.
If we understand Kar and Radin to require actual agreement on
terms, then some of the provisions of the EEI Master Contract are not
part of their contract. If we understand Kar and Radin to allow for
terms to which there would have been agreement in a counterfactual
oral exchange, then these provisions are part of the contract. But they
cannot have it both ways.
There is another solution to this problem, which is suggested by the
idea of Reasonably Accessible Meaning. We might take the position
that the terms of the EEI Master Contract govern so long as they are
either part of its Shared Actual Meaning or its Reasonably Accessible
Meaning. That is, we could explicitly acknowledge the distinction between meaning that is actually shared and meaning that is reasonably
accessible but not actually shared. This way of talking has one important advantage of conceptual clarity: it makes the distinction between actual sharing and reasonable accessibility clear and transparent.
Not explicitly acknowledging the distinction between Shared Actual
Meaning and Reasonably Accessible Meaning has several disadvantages. The question whether a complex form contract would be
comprehensible in an oral exchange is an empirical one. The answer
depends on the findings of cognitive science regarding mental processing
of information conveyed in oral exchanges. If those findings reveal that
some complex written agreements can be understood in written form,
but that their complexity is such that they cannot be conveyed in an oral
exchange, Kar and Radin’s test will reject their inclusion in the contract.
But this result seems arbitrary. If we are after Shared Actual Meaning,
communicative content that was accessed by all of the parties to a contract, then the question is whether the provisions of a written contract
were understood as conveyed in writing. The fact that the provisions
would not have been understood if they had been conveyed orally is
simply not relevant to question whether they were actually shared.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See supra section II.A.2, p. 47.
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These issues are made more complex by the fact that Kar and
Radin’s test does not exclude all contractual provisions that did not produce Shared Actual Meaning. Without the double negative in the prior
sentence, the point is that Kar and Radin would give legal effect to unshared meanings.
Provisions that pass the oral exchange test are part of a contract,
even if they were not actually read and comprehended. So, the oral
exchange test seems to allow for provisions that satisfy something that
resembles the criterion of Reasonably Accessible Meaning. Perhaps Kar
and Radin believe that access is reasonable if the terms would have been
comprehended as part of an oral conversation. But why is an imaginary
oral conversation the proper standard for what is reasonably accessible?
If the parties could have understood the provisions in written form using
effort that is proportionate to the stakes (for example, the monetary
value of the agreement), then why should it matter whether the terms
would have been understood in an oral exchange? For example, the
EEI Master Contract might be comprehensible to lawyers who spend a
reasonable amount of time studying its provisions in written form; this
might involve rereading complex sentences and tracing the interaction
between various provisions. Why should it matter if the provisions
could not be understood in an oral conversation? So far as I can tell,
Kar and Radin do not provide a normative defense of their oral
conversation test.
2. Shared Meaning and Fine Print. — How should contract law
treat fine print? Kar and Radin discuss this problem131 in the context
of Izadi v. Machado (Gus) Ford, Inc.132 For my purposes the key fact
of the Izadi case is that an offer in a newspaper to provide a $3000 tradein value on any car was limited in “infinitesimally small print” to the
purchase of two particular cars, neither of which was pictured in the
advertisement.133 When Izadi attempted to purchase one of the cars
that was pictured (a 1988 Ford Ranger Pick-Up), he was informed of
the fine print.134
Kar and Radin apply their imaginary oral contract test as follows:
Use of the conceptual test of [S]hared [M]eaning [A]nalysis suggests that
oral communication of the ad would have conversationally implied —
without literally saying — that the $3,000 minimum trade-in allowance applied to the purchase of a 1988 Ford Ranger Pick-Up. When the car dealership tried to add an additional limitation, through “infinitesimally small
print,” one would have to imagine that an agent for the dealership proposed
this additional limitation only inaudibly, under his breath. This proposed

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1192–95.
550 So. 2d 1135 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
Kar & Radin, supra note 1, at 1193–94 (citing Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1138).
Id.

64

HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM

[Vol. 133:23

limitation was not communicated clearly enough to comply with the Maxim
of Manner — which says to communicate clearly. It therefore failed to
contribute any proposed terms that were ever under discussion or actually
agreed to when the parties formed their contract.135

This analysis is insightful, but it raises several questions. First, when
the written offer is transposed into an oral conversation, Kar and Radin
stipulate that the additional limitations were proposed “inaudibly” under the breath of the agent for the dealership. But this stipulation seems
contrary to the general design of the thought experiment. Consider how
this move might be transposed into another context, clickwrap agreements. We could just as easily imagine that clickwrap terms are delivered from a great distance so that they cannot be heard. If the fine print
is truly incomprehensible because the print is so fine as to be unreadable
(truly inaccessible or figuratively infinitesimal), then it is not part of the
writing and we don’t need the thought experiment to show this. If the
fine print is legible, then it seems inappropriate to make it inaudible in
the thought experiment. The more natural translation would be an oral
communication that is delivered at a low volume that requires focused
attention. The more general point is that the outcome of the thought
experiment hinges on seemingly arbitrary decisions about how to translate the actual written communication into a hypothetical oral exchange.
In Izadi (or a hypothetical variation of its facts), the terms in fine
print were not part of the Shared Actual Meaning of the offer, because
the offeree, Izadi, did not read them. Were these terms nonetheless part
of the Reasonably Accessible Meaning? The question is not whether it
would have been possible for the offeree to access the term limiting the
offer: presumably it was possible, although it might have required a
magnifying glass. Rather, the question is whether the fine print was
reasonably accessible: Could it have been understood by an ordinary
person making an effort that is reasonable under the circumstances?
Perhaps, the problem is not that the consumer could not have read
the fine print, but that we believe that it is unreasonable to require consumers to do this. Defining the standard for reasonable accessibility is
beyond the scope of this Response, but it seems likely that a defensible
conception of reasonable accessibility would result in the conclusion that
the fine print limitation was not part of the reasonably accessible content
of the agreement. For example, if the print was so fine that it could only
be read by use of a magnifying glass, then we might conclude that it
was not reasonably accessible.
But there is another aspect of Izadi that seems more fundamental.
The advertisement appears to have been designed to be deliberately misleading. Even if a wary consumer could reasonably have accessed the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135

Id. at 1194.
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fine print, the combination of the large print offer of a $3000 trade-in
on any vehicle with pictures of vehicles that were excluded by the fine
print136 supports the inference that the advertisement was intended to
deceive consumers, luring customers into the dealership by creating the
impression that they could get a $3000 trade-in on their $500 junker for
the purchase of a desirable and reasonably priced Ford Ranger. This
would be a classic “bait and switch.”137
The discussion of strategic and cooperative contractual communication above demonstrated the conceptual independence of the distinction
between strategic and cooperative communication, on the one hand, and
shared and unshared meaning on the other.138 Suppose that Izadi had
actually read the fine print with the aid of a magnifying glass and understood the exclusion. The term would then have been part of the
Shared Actual Meaning of the offer, but the offer would nonetheless
have been a strategic contractual communication that aimed at deception but failed. The question whether we should nonetheless allow Izadi
to enforce the offer as he would have understood it if he had been deceived is an interesting one, but the notion of shared meaning that is infact shared would not urge an affirmative answer.
There is another dimension of the Izadi case illuminated by the
Gricean idea of speaker’s meaning — the meaning the speaker or author
intends the listener to grasp via the listener’s or reader’s recognition of
the speaker’s communicative intentions. In the Izadi case, it seems
plausible that the dealership intended to communicate different messages to different readers and to the same readers on different occasions.
Customers were intended to recognize one communicative intention at
the time they initially read the advertisement (no limitation to the two
particular models) and another communicative intention when the fine
print was drawn to their attention when they proffered a trade-in on a
model outside the limitation. This second communicative intention provided the meaning that the dealership hoped to convey to courts, if a
consumer tried to hold the dealership to its offer. In other words, the
dealership was speaking out of both sides of its mouth.
Under these circumstances, we might say that the limitation to two
particular models was not part of the offer to Izadi. Izadi correctly
grasped the dealership’s communicative intentions directed to consumers: if Izadi then accepted the offer, Shared Actual Meaning would have
been created. This can be true, even though the advertisement
embodied multiple and inconsistent communicative intentions. The
communicative intention conveyed to Izadi at the time he read the advertisement differed from the intention conveyed when the fine print
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Izadi, 550 So. 2d at 1137.
See David Adam Friedman, Explaining “Bait-and-Switch” Regulation, 4 WM. & MARY BUS.
L. REV. 575, 580–81 (2013) (defining “bait and switch”).
138 See supra section I.B.3(c), p. 43.
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was pointed out. The text was the same; the communicative intentions
conveyed by the text in distinct contexts were different. This feature of
the Izadi case shows the importance of clearly distinguishing the semantics and pragmatics of contractual communication: the same text (the
advertisement) produces different communicative content when read in
different contexts.
In sum, I would like to suggest that cases like Izadi are more complex
than Kar and Radin’s analysis would suggest. Moreover, it is not clear
that either Grice’s maxims of conversation or the imaginary oral conversation thought experiment provides the most perspicuous analysis of
cases involving strategic contractual communication. Even if we agree
with Kar and Radin that Izadi should prevail, our reasons may differ
from theirs.
D. First- and Second-Order Communicative Intentions
At this point, we can step back and examine an issue that has been
lurking in the background so far. In the discussion of the “black hole
problem” associated with pari passu clauses, I introduced the idea of
“first-order” and “second-order” communicative intentions.139 This idea
is well articulated by Professor Michael Moore: “An interpretive intent
is a second-order intention about how one’s first order intentions are to
be used in interpreting what one has said.”140
Let us now stipulate the following definitions:
First-Order Communicative Intention: A first-order communicative
intention is an intention to convey particular content via an utterance
or writing. Example: Harry utters “Simon is beautiful” with the firstorder communicative intention to convey the proposition Simon Wong
is a physically beautiful man.
Second-Order Communicative Intention: A second-order communicative intention is an intention regarding first-order communicative intentions. Example: James Madison writes the text of the First
Amendment to the Constitution with the second-order intention that the
communicative content conveyed by the text be the public meaning of
the text.
Second-order communicative intentions play an important role in legal communication. Thus, the drafters of the constitutional text might
have had a second-order communicative intention that the text be understood to have the content conveyed by its public meaning and that
in cases of divergence between public meaning and their private first–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
139
140

See supra section II.A.3, pp. 48–51.
Michael S. Moore, Justifying the Natural Law Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 2087, 2096 (2001); see also Adrian Vermeule, Judicial History, 108 YALE L.J.
1311, 1323 (1999) (“On some versions of intentionalism, interpreters are bound not only by the
lawmakers’ substantive intention to enact rules with certain content, but also by their secondorder intentions about how the rules are to be interpreted.”).
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order communicative intentions, the public meaning should prevail.
Likewise, the drafters of a statute may have a second-order communicative intention that the text of the statute be understood to have its
plain meaning, even if that meaning differs from the drafters own firstorder communicative intentions.
The distinction between first- and second-order communicative
intentions operates in the context of contractual communication. For
example, the parties to the EEI Master Contract might intend that the
agreement have the communicative content intended by the Drafting
Committee, even if that content differs from the content assumed by one
or even all of the parties to a contract modeled on the Master Contract.
In this case, the second-order communicative intentions of the parties
would point to Reasonably Accessible Meaning as the intended meaning. All would be well if the parties’ first-order communicative intentions mesh with their second-order communicative intentions, but in
cases of divergence the law will have to choose. Moreover, the parties
might actually express a second-order communicative intention in the
agreement itself. For example, the EEI Master Contract might have
included an “interpretation clause”141 specifying that in the case of disagreement over the meaning of the text the communicative intentions of
the drafters would govern.
So far as I can tell, Kar and Radin elide the questions raised by “interpretive intent” or “second-order communicative intentions,” but
Shared Meaning Analysis seems to take a stand on the second-order
question as to which communicative intentions should govern. Or perhaps Kar and Radin take more than one stand, shifting from meaning
that was actually shared to the meaning that would have been shared if
the parties had communicated in the way that would have been most
consistent with the maxims. In either case, it is at least possible that the
second-order communicative intentions of the parties to a contract
would conflict with Shared Meaning Analysis. I am not sure how Kar
and Radin would deal with such cases, but I would like to know.
E. The Implications of Shared Meaning Analysis
for the Interpretation of Contractual Communication
We are now in a position to appreciate the relationship between the
general account of legal communication that was developed in Part I
and Kar and Radin’s shared meaning account of contractual communication. That relationship is complex. On the one hand, we need to
consider Kar and Radin’s three distinct definitions of shared meaning.142
On the other hand, we need to account for several features of legal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
141 See Uri Benoliel, The Interpretation of Commercial Contracts: An Empirical Study, 69 ALA.
L. REV. 469, 480 (2017) (discussing “merger clauses” as a type of “interpretation clause”).
142 See supra section II.B.3, pp. 56–58. I now turn to Kar and Radin’s explication of the idea of
“shared meaning.”
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communication, including (1) the distinction between speaker’s meaning
and sentence meaning, (2) the semantic and pragmatic mechanisms by
which communicative content is conveyed, (3) the limited role of the
maxims as rules of thumb, (4) the distinction between first-order and
second-order communicative intentions, and (5) the distinction between
cooperative and strategic legal communication. And we must bear in
mind the interpretation-construction distinction which highlights the
difference between the meaning of contractual provisions and their legal
effect.
On the surface, Kar and Radin’s approach seems to offer a simple
and powerful theory of contract interpretation. Readers might believe
that the application of Shared Meaning Analysis enables us to identify
the “true meaning” of a written contract. We run the written contract
through the oral-conversation thought experiment, which then enables
us to identify the Maxim Maximizing Meaning (the meaning that is most
consistent with the Gricean maxims of conversation). But appearances
are deceiving. Application of Kar and Radin’s framework can result in
content that is different from both the actually shared meaning of the
parties and the meaning that was not actually shared by them but was
reasonably accessible to them.
Consider the following examples of divergence:
Cases in which the parties recognize noncooperative (strategic) communication but nonetheless have shared understandings. Example:
Party A understands that Party B is trying to pull a fast one, but
nonetheless agrees because the strategically motivated language is actually in Party A’s interests.
Cases in which the parties hold shared second-order communicative
intentions but divergent first-order communicative contentions.
Example: Parties A and B sign a form contract such as the EEI Master
Contract with the second-order intention that it be given its drafter’s
meaning. However, none of the agents of A and B actually read and
comprehended some of its provisions, even though the agents of either
A or B would have understood all of the provisions if they had read
them with the degree of effort that is reasonable under the
circumstances.
Cases in which the written agreement is comprehensible to the parties, but the hypothetical oral conversation would not result in shared
meaning. Example: The written contract is long and as a result there
were pragmatic enrichments (such as implicitures and presuppositions)
that would be cognitively accessible to a careful reader (such as a lawyer
doing due diligence) but would not be accessible in an oral conversation.
These examples bring out the reasons for rejecting the idea that
Shared Meaning Analysis provides a reliable method of contract
interpretation that yields the true meaning that a written contract had
for the parties. A more accurate way of characterizing Shared Meaning
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Analysis is that it is a method of contract construction that yields legally
enforceable contract provisions that may differ in systematic ways from
the meanings upon which the relevant first- and/or second-order
communicative intentions of the parties converged.
III. METALINGUISTIC CONTESTATION:
“CONTRACT” AND “PSEUDO-CONTRACT”
One more topic before I close. Kar and Radin distinguish between
“contract” and “pseudo-contract.” As they understand it, “the distinction
between shared meaning (contract) and meaning that is not shared
(pseudo-contract)” marks the difference between two fundamentally
different categories.143 They argue that scholars and courts have failed
to appreciate the significance of this basic conceptual distinction because
of what they call a “paradigm slip”:
We will describe the result of this process as an unconscious or undiagnosed “paradigm slip.” In an unconscious paradigm slip, each small step in
application aims to preserve the purposes, basic concepts, and coherence of
a body of doctrine, but the overall result is a largely unintended and more
fundamental change in the meanings and functions of its core concepts. As
a result of a largely unconscious paradigm slip in contract law, many courts
and scholars now assume that all boilerplate text contributes “terms” to a
“contract” in largely unproblematic ways akin to the simpler uses of
language to form contracts in 1883. They assume that pseudo-contractual
text should be enforced as “contract” with minimal requirements of “assent,”
unless there is some standard contract law obstacle to enforcement arising
from something like illegality or unconscionability. This is to treat pseudocontract as contract without adequate reflection. A major noncontractual
intrusion into the traditional sphere of contract law and modern market
activity has gone largely unrecognized; or, at least, the full depths and problematic nature of the intervention have escaped widespread notice.144

Thus, Kar and Radin would restrict the proper use of the word
“contract” and associated terms like “contractual” and “contracting” to
agreements reached on the basis of shared meaning.145 Without shared
meaning there is no contract, although there might be a pseudocontract.146 The terms of contracts are determined by shared meaning,
although other terms might create additional pseudo-contractual
obligations.147
What kind of move are Kar and Radin making? Why do they believe that the distinction between “contract” and “pseudo-contract” is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 1155.
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important? Why should we resist the “paradigm slip”? One important
angle on these questions is provided by the distinction between “words”
and concepts.148 “Contract” is a word, as are associated words and
phrases like “contractual assent” or “contract terms.” The word “contract” has an ordinary meaning in American English, and it may well
have a more specialized and nuanced meaning in the linguistic subcommunity of lawyers and judges. But the word “contract” represents a
concept that could be expressed in other words. For example, the
English word “contract” is translated as “Contrat” in French,149
“Vertrag” in German,150 and “mkataba” in Swahili.151 The word “contract” is used to convey the concept contract.
It might seem that Kar and Radin are merely quibbling about definitions, but I do not believe that the real thrust of their argument is
about the meaning of the word “contract.” If that were their concern,
then we should be able to test their claim against the linguistic evidence.
The conventional semantic meaning of the word “contract” is a function
of patterns of usage,152 but Kar and Radin themselves observe that paradigm slip has resulted from the extension of the word “contract” to
agreements without shared meaning, which they call “pseudocontracts.”153 In other words, current usage (after the paradigm slip)
disfavors their proposed definition. For this reason, I think that the
heart of Kar and Radin’s claim is conceptual rather than terminological.
Kar and Radin believe that the concept of contract is being misused,
but it is unclear why. They might believe that contract has an essence.154
Natural kind terms like “gold” represent concepts that have an essence
provided by natural science: for something to be gold, it must have the
atomic structure of gold.155 Moore has argued that concepts employed
by the law, which he calls “functional kinds,” and might also be called
“moral kinds,” have essences which can be investigated by legal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See supra section I.B.3(a), pp. 40–42.
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theory.156 Perhaps, Kar and Radin believe that contract is a functional
kind with an essence, although I was unable to find any evidence of
such a belief in Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis.157
Or perhaps they see the problem through the lens of the conceptconception distinction, famously deployed by John Rawls,158 who drew
on Essentially Contested Concepts, by the philosopher William Gallie.159
Rawls argued that “justice” is a contested concept; he offered his theory,
which he called “justice as fairness,” as a conception of justice that competes with rival conceptions such as utilitarianism.160 Kar and Radin
might believe that contract is a contested concept and that Shared
Meaning Analysis offers the best conception of that concept. They
might then employ the method of reflective equilibrium to demonstrate
that Shared Meaning Analysis best accounts for our considered judgments about contract law. So far as I can tell, Kar and Radin do not
pursue this strategy in Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning
Analysis.161
Related to the notion that there can be different conceptions of
contested concepts is the idea of metalinguistic negotiation.162 A
metalinguistic negotiation involves a dispute over a word or phrase and
its associated concept. One way to move forward in the process of
metalinguistic negotiation is to agree on standards of conceptual ethics.
For example, we might argue that in the context of legal theory, the
concept of contract ought to be sufficiently broad to account for disagreements among contract theorists about the best normative account
of contract law. It might be argued that an attempt to tie the concept
of contract to a particular normative theory involves an illicit attempt
to leverage a metalinguistic proposal into a substantive victory in the
normative debate. If Kar and Radin were attempting to make this
move, it might be suggested that the attempt to relegate other normative
theories of contract to the realm of pseudo-contract fails to preserve the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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conceptual structure of theoretical debates about the nature and proper
function of contract law.
I am not sure about the deep foundations of Kar and Radin’s argument that contract should be limited to agreements with shared meaning
in their sense and that the rest of what is now called “contract law”
should be moved to their newly proposed category of “pseudo-contract.”
I confess that I am worried about this move. I am worried because of
substantive concerns about Kar and Radin’s theory of shared meaning.
At this point, their theory is innovative, provocative, and challenging,
but I am not sure that it is fully baked. My tentative opinion is that
their account of shared meaning faces serious challenges on several
fronts, including the problem of reconciling what seems to be an emphasis on actually shared communicative content with ideas about counterfactual meanings related to Grice’s maxims of conversation. If the best
theory of contractual communication incorporates ideas about reasonably accessible communicative content and the distinction between firstorder and second-order communicative intentions, then it would be a
mistake to bake Kar and Radin’s theory of shared meaning into the
concept of contract itself. These considerations push me in the direction
of a more capacious account of the concept of contract, one that allows
for a greater diversity of views about the best normative theory of
contract law.
At this point, some readers may be impatient with the emphasis on
metalinguistic and conceptual issues. Readers with a realist bent might
make the following point:
I don’t give a hoot whether boilerplate agreements are called
“contracts” or “pseudo-contracts.” You can call them “schmomtracts”163
for all I care. Conceptual niceties may have their place, but the truly
important question is whether these agreements are enforceable or not.
Tell me what practical difference it makes, and then I can tell you
whether or not I buy the argument.
A full reply to this point would require an extended discussion of the
value of conceptual clarity and the development of a normative theory
of contract law: neither task can be undertaken in this Response. It is
not clear that the acceptance of Kar and Radin’s argument would result
in judicial determination that some boilerplate agreements are unenforceable: the result could be the development of a distinct body of
pseudo-contract doctrine. So far as I can tell, Kar and Radin do not
advance the claim that all pseudo-contracts should be legally unenforceable, nor do they provide a test for those pseudo-contracts that should
be enforced and those that should not.
Although I cannot make the argument on this occasion, I should
think that it is clear that at least some agreements with Unshared Actual
Meanings that are reasonably accessible to the parties should be legally
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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enforceable. For example, in Scenario One, the meaning of the EEI
Master Contract is reasonably accessible to the parties even though the
meaning was not actually shared at the time of contract formation.164
But it seems obvious that invalidation of a contract modeled on the
Master Contract would upset the expectations of the parties. In complex
transactions like those covered by the Master Contract, requiring all the
parties to actually understand all the provisions might well be very
costly. Requiring parties to negotiate a bespoke alternative to the
Master Contract for each and every wholesale electricity-supply transaction would seem to impose obvious and unnecessary costs. Of course,
these common-sense observations fall far short of a rigorous argument,
but they suggest that the notion of Reasonably Accessible Meanings may
do important normative work that cannot be done by Shared Meaning
Analysis alone.
CONCLUSION
Let me end where I started, with high praise for Pseudo-Contract
and Shared Meaning Analysis. Although Kar and Radin’s article has
prompted me to ask a variety of questions and to raise a series of objections, I believe that this is testimony to the importance of their project.
Like Kar and Radin, I believe that attention to the philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics is crucially important to progress in
legal theory generally and to disputes about interpretation and construction of constitutions, statutes, rules, regulations, and contracts — to start
a list that undoubtedly is much longer. Like Kar and Radin, I believe
that Paul Grice’s theory of meaning is an important starting point, and
like them, I believe that Grice’s maxims teach important lessons about
the ways in which legal communication works.
Unlike Kar and Radin, I am not convinced that Grice’s maxims of
communication provide the magic key that will unlock the door to the
true meanings of legal communications. The maxims are rules of thumb
that frequently enable us to communicate more efficiently and effectively, but rules of thumb are not (and should not become) rules of law.
The maxims are part of the story but only a part. The full story must
include an account of semantic and pragmatic mechanisms, the
distinction between first- and second-order communicative intentions,
the idea of Reasonably Accessible Meaning, and much else.
But even if Kar and Radin have overestimated the role of the maxims in answering questions about the meaning of contractual communications, Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis is an important
landmark in the application of ideas from the philosophy of language
and theoretical linguistics to contract theory. Pathbreaking scholarship
frequently raises more questions than it answers and starts more debates
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than it finishes. Kar and Radin are raising the truly important questions, and their work seems likely to start a whole series of debates about
the nature of contractual communication.
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